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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue #1
(a)

Did the Trial Court properly rule that Susan Morgan, a Deputy in the

Utah County Sheriffs Department (hereinafter "Deputy Morgan"), is not a
policymaker for Utah County and therefore liability cannot attach to Utah County?
(b)

The standard of review for this Court is to consider the Trial Court's

interpretation of the law for correctness. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518
(Utah 1992). "Questions of common law interpretation are questions of law which
the appellate court is well suited to address, and thus give no deference to the
lower court." Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992).
(c)

The Pintars preserved this issue for appeal in the Trial Court. R. 137-

40, 1292.
Issue #2
(a)

In considering the Utah County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, did the Trial Court
properly not consider certain facts plead by the Pintars as true, including, but not
limited to, the allegations made by Appellees, Martin Houck and Darlene Houck

1

(hereinafter "Houcks") to Deputy Morgan that, even if true, did not constitute a
crime under Utah law?
(b)

In considering a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn from
them in the light most favorable to the Pintars as the non-moving party. Whipple v.
American Fork Irrigation Company, 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996); Russell v.
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995) citing Colman v. Utah State Land
Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d
668, 669 (Utah 1989); Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081, 1082 (Utah 2000); Cruz
v. MiddlekauffLincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1241, 1253 (Utah 1996).
(c)

The Pintars preserved this issue for appeal in the Trial Court. R. 4-5,

818, 829-30, 854, 862, 947-50, 956, 970, 980, 983, 985, 987, 992, 1135, 1292.
Issue #3
(a)

Did the Trial Court err in finding that Deputy Morgan is protected by

qualified immunity and therefore shielded from liability against the Pintars'
Second and Third Causes of action for Conspiracy and Malicious Prosecution
pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983?
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(b)

The standard of review for Issue #3 is identical to that of Issue #1,

supra (this Court is to consider the Trial Court's interpretation of the law for
correctness).
(c)

The Pintars preserved this issue for appeal in the Trial Court. R. 4-5,

141-45, 1292.
Issue #4
(a)

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying the Pintars' Motion

for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint?
(b)

The Trial Court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable basis

for the decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
(c)

The Pintars preserved this issue for appeal in the Trial Court. R. 357-

59, 486-88, 1295.
Issue #5
(a)

Did the Trial Court properly rule as a matter of law it cannot grant the

declaratory relief the Pintars are requesting in their first cause of action?
(b)

The standard of review for Issue #5 is identical to that of Issue #1,

supra (this Court is to consider the Trial Court's interpretation of the law for
correctness).
(c)

The Pintars preserved this issue for appeal in the Trial Court. R. 2-3,

812-14,823-27,1293-94.
3

Issue #6
(a)

In considering the Houcks' Motion for Summary Judgment, did the

Trial Court properly not consider certain facts plead by the Pintars as true,
including, but not limited to, the allegations made by the Houcks to Deputy
Morgan that, even if true, did not constitute a crime under Utah law?
(b)

In considering a motion for summary judgment and determining

whether there are any genuine issues of material fact for a trier-of-fact to decide,
the Court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d
104, 107 (Utah 1991); Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1990).
(c)

The Pintars preserved this issue for appeal in the Trial Court. R. 4, 5,

818, 829-30, 854, 862, 947-50, 956, 970, 980, 983, 985, 987, 992,1135, 1294.
Issue #7
(a)

Did the trial court properly find that as a matter of law, there are no

triable issues of fact regarding the Pintars' Second Cause of Action for Malicious
Prosecution pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, Third Cause of Action for Civil
Conspiracy pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, and Civil Conspiracy pursuant to
state law?

4

(b)

The standard of review for Issue #7 is identical to that of Issue #1,

supra (this Court is to consider the Trial Court's interpretation of the law for
correctness).
(c)

The Pintars preserved this issue for appeal in the Trial Court. R. 828-

37, 1294.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
I.

Utah Criminal Code §76-9-102 states:
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:

(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move from a
public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive, by any act
which serves no legitimate purpose; or
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he;
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior;
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place;
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard in a
public place;
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
IL

Utah Code Ann. §17-22-2 states in pertinent part:
Sheriff- General Duties.
(1) The Sheriff shall

III.

(b) make all lawful arrests

Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 states in pertinent part:

A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(3) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe the person has
committed a public offense....
IV.

Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:

A party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent
of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings
On November 1, 2007, Appellants, Lewis J. Pintar and Afton B. Pintar
(hereinafter "Pintars") filed a Complaint and Jury Demand in the Fourth District
Court in Provo, Utah naming Martin Houck, Darlene Houck, Tony Houck, Susan
Morgan, Kay Bryson, and Timothy Barnes as Defendants. R. 1. On February 14,
2008, the Pintars amended their Complaint to replace "DOE Defendant 1" with
Utah County. R. 13-14. Along with general allegations, the Pintars alleged eleven
causes of action in their Complaint. R. 1-12. The First Cause of Action is the
Pintars' request for Declaratory Relief as to Defendants, Martin Houck and
Darlene Houck, regarding the Pintars' rights and responsibilities as to the irrigation
of their agricultural land. R. 6-7. The Second and Third Causes of Action—
Malicious Prosecution and Conspiracy—are as to all Defendants pursuant to
U.S.C. Title 42 §1983. R. 7-8. The Fourth through Seventh Causes of action—
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Civil Conspiracy, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, Defamation—are state law claims as to all Defendants. R.
8-10. The Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action -Negligent Misrepresentation and
Intentional Misrepresentation—are state law claims as to Defendants Martin
Houck, Darlene Houck and Susan Morgan. R. 10-11. The Tenth and Eleventh
Causes of Action (mislabeled as the Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action)—
Negligent Misrepresentation and Intentional Misrepresentation—are as to
Defendants Martin Houck and Darlene Houck. R. 11-12.
On March 24, 2008, counsel for Defendants Tonya Houck, Susan Morgan,
Kay Bryson, Timothy Barnes and Utah County (the "Utah County Defendants")
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
R. 66. Counsel on behalf of the same Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 46. Counsel on
behalf of the same Defendants filed a third Motion to Bifurcate the case regarding
the "Utah County Defendants from Defendants, Martin and Darlene Houck. R. 8289. The Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) was as to the Pintars' causes
of action pursuant to U.S.C. Title 42 §1983. R. 66-81. The Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) was as to the Pintars' causes of action pursuant to state
law claims. R. 46-65. Defendants Martin Houck and Darlene Houck did not join
the Utah County Defendants in these Motions.
7

Defendants Kay Bryson and

Timothy Barnes were dismissed without prejudice by stipulation filed by the
parties on May 27, 2008. R. 158-60.
On August 20, 2008, the Fourth District Court, the Hon. Gary D. Stott
presiding, issued a Memorandum Decision granting both of the Utah County
Defendants' motions to dismiss, and the Court dismissed the Utah County
Defendants from the case. R. 194-212. The Court further ruled that since the Utah
County Defendants' motions to dismiss were granted, their Motion to Bifurcate
was moot. R. 210. On September 10, 2008, the decision of the Court to dismiss
the Utah County Defendants was memorialized as an Order of the Court. R. 213220. On October 7, 2008, the Pintars filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court's
decision regarding the 12(b)(6) motion for the claims pursuant to U.S.C. Title 42
§1983. R. 221-24. However, this Court dismissed the Notice of Appeal without
prejudice to re-file pursuant to the Utah County Defendants' Motion for Summary
Disposition. R. 299-302. This Court based its decision on the fact that all claims
against all Defendants had not been adjudicated (Defendants Martin and Darlene
Houck remained in the case) and the order of the Court had not been properly
certified as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R.
299-302.
After the Utah County Defendants were dismissed, the Pintars and
Defendants Martin and Darlene Houck entered into a Stipulated Case Management
8

Order which was filed with the Trial Court on April 27, 2009. R. 324-27. The
parties subsequently filed an Amended Stipulated Case Management Order which
was filed with the Court on August 4, 2009. R. 329-31. Pursuant to the Amended
Stipulated Case Management Order, the parties agreed to a deadline to amend the
pleadings of October 31, 2009. R. 330. On October 20, 2009, the Pintars filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint.1 R. 332-69. On January
19, 2010, Fourth District Court, the Hon. David N. Mortensen presiding, denied
the Pintars9 Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. R. 789, 1295.
Also on January 19, 2010, Defendants Martin and Darlene Houck filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of the remaining causes of action against
them. R. 623-788. On May 7, 2010, the Fourth District Court, the Hon. David N.
Mortensen presiding, issued a memorandum decision granting the Houck
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed them from the case. R.
1248-75. The Memorandum Decision was memorialized by written Order filed on
June 14, 2010. R. 1289-91.
The Pintars filed Notice of Appeal on May 28, 2010. R. 1278-81. In their
Notice of Appeal and subsequent Docketing Statement filed on June 18, 2010, the
Pintars state that they are appealing the following issues:
1

The Pintars' First Amended Complaint was simply replacing the name of "DOE
Defendant 1" with Utah County. This was done prior to service of the Complaint.
There were no substantive changes to the complaint with this amendment.
9

(1)

The Memorandum Decision dated August 20, 2008 and subsequent

Order dated September 10, 2008 dismissing the Second and Third Causes of
Action for Civil Conspiracy and Malicious Prosecution pursuant to U.S.C. Title 42
§1983 against Defendants Deputy Susan Morgan and Utah County;
(2)

The Order denying the Pintars leave to file their Second Amended

Complaint issued from the bench on January 19, 2010;
(3)

The Memorandum Decision dated May 7, 2010 and subsequent Order

dated June 14, 2010, granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Martin
Houck and Defendant Darlene Houck as to all causes of action. The Pintars
appealed as to the First Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief), Second Cause of
Action (Civil Conspiracy pursuant to U.S.C. Title 42 §1983), Third Cause of
Action (Malicious Prosecution pursuant to U.S.C. Title 42 §1983), Fourth Cause of
Action (Civil Conspiracy), Fifth Cause of Action (Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress), Sixth Cause of Action (Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, and Seventh Cause of Action (Defamation).
The Pintars hereby waive appeal as to the Fifth Cause of Action (Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress), Sixth Cause of Action (Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, and Seventh Cause of Action (Defamation).
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Statement of Facts
1.

The Pintars are husband and wife and residents on agricultural

property located in and around 4808 South 1850 West, Spanish Fork, Utah.
Appellees Martin Houck and Darlene Houck (hereinafter "Houcks") are husband
and wife and residents on agricultural property located in and around 2015 West
4780 South, Spanish Fork, Utah. R. 1, 812.
2.

The Plaintiffs and the Houcks share a common boundary between

their property—the western boundary for Plaintiffs and the eastern boundary for
the Houcks. R. 2, 812, 851, 859.
3.

Plaintiffs have lived on their property since on or about 1977. R. 813,

850, 858. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that their property was owned by
direct ancestors of Plaintiff, Afton B. Pintar, going back to at least the 1930s.
R. 813,851,859.
4.

The Houcks purchased the property that they own, which is the

subject property herein, in 1991. R. 813, 851, 859, 1068, 1082.
5.

The Pintars have irrigated their property in the same manner since

about 1977. Prior to that, the Pintars are informed and believe that their ancestors
irrigated the property in the same manner. R. 851, 859.
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6.

The Houck property is lower in elevation than the Pintar property. R.

813,851,859.
7.

The irrigation water on both properties flows from south to north. R.

814,851,859,1070.
8.

There were no improvements on the Houck property prior to 1991. R.

814,851,859,1069.
9.

The Houcks constructed their home and improvements on their

property on the north end despite the fact that is where the water flowed. R. 814,
851,859,1070.
10.

On July 8, 2004, the Houcks sent correspondence to the Pintars

threatening "further action" if the Pintars did not take care of "their" flooding
problem. R. 814, 851, 859, 1095
11.

The Pintars subsequently went to the Houcks' home in July, 2004, to

discuss the matter with them in an effort to resolve it. They spoke with Darlene
Houck, who has subsequently stated repeatedly throughout this matter that the
Pintars were threatening to her and used profanity at her when the Pintars
discussed the matter with her—an accusation that the Pintars have denied. R. 81415, 851-52, 859-60, 1084-90, 1106, 1110.
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12.

The Pintars denied that the flooding, if any, was the result of their

doing anything improper. R. 3, 815.
13.

Since the conversation on or about July, 2004, with regard to the

Houcks' correspondence, Lewis J. Pintar, has had no direct contact with the
Houcks, and Plaintiff, Aflon B. Pintar, has only had direct contact on two
occasions when Plaintiffs' cows got out of their property. R. 815, 852, 860.
14.

There has been great hostility exhibited by the Houcks toward the

Pintars over the years, including contacting the Utah County Sheriffs Department
at least six times regarding Plaintiffs. R. 819-22, 855-56, 863-65, 1071-74, 10961115,1130.
15.

On May 12, 2006, Martin Houck sped his truck onto property which

was owned by Aflon B. Pintar and yelled and cursed at Aflon B. Pintar who was
there tending her grandchildren, one of whom, a minor, was present. Martin
Houck, angrily accused Afton B. Pintar of stealing his irrigation water, which was
false, in front of her grandchild, a minor. Actually, Martin Houck had forgotten to
pull the dam out of the ditch to let the irrigation water through to his property.
Nicholas Pintar, the son of Lewis J. Pintar and Aflon B. Pintar, who was present on
the property, heard the commotion caused by Martin Houck and verbally
confronted him regarding the situation and Martin Houck left the property. R. 81516, 847-48, 853.
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16.

The Houcks contacted the Sheriffs Department on May 12, 2006. At

that time, and all times relevant herein, the Houcks' daughter-in-law, Tonya
Houck, was employed at the Utah County Sheriffs Office.

R. 3, 816, 818-19,

848,944,1116-18
17.

The Houcks called their daughter-in-law, Tonya Houck, regarding the

Pintars on May 12, 2006, the same day they called the Utah County Sheriffs
Department regarding the Pintars. R. 819, 1048.
18.

When the Sheriffs Officer, Deputy Susan Morgan (hereinafter

"Deputy Morgan") responded in person at the Houcks' residence, they told her that
their daughter-in-law, Tonya Houck, worked at the same Utah County Sheriffs
Office. R. 818-19, 834, 854, 862, 929, 1018, 1294.
19.

Lewis J. Pintar was not present during the incident on May 12, 2006.

Despite this, the Houcks had contacted the Utah County Sheriffs Department
regarding Lewis J. Pintar even though the confrontation was between Martin
Houck and Nicholas Pintar. R. 816-17, 861, 1078, 1092-1093, 1116-18.
20.

That same day Deputy Morgan went to the Pintar property and rudely

confronted Afton B. Pintar in a threatening manner. Deputy Morgan threatened
Afton B. Pintar with criminal sanctions if Lewis J. Pintar had any further contact
with the Houcks. When Afton B. Pintar told Deputy Morgan that Lewis J. Pintar
was not present earlier that day and had nothing to do with the incident caused by
14

Martin Houck, she was quickly rebuffed by Deputy Morgan.

No written

documents were given to the Pintars on May 12, 2006, by Deputy Morgan. R. 3-4,
816-17,853,861.
21.

On August 20, 2006, the Houcks reported to Deputy Morgan that on

June 11, 2006, Lewis J. Pintar hollered "there go the monkees [sic]" as they
walked by the Pintar property. The Pintars have denied this accusation. R. 817,
854,862,1123.
22.

Also on August 20, 2006, the Houcks reported to Deputy Morgan that

on July 4, 2006, Lewis J. Pintar shook his finger at Darlene Houck and made
derogatory remarks at a 4th of July flag-raising ceremony. The Pintars have denied
this accusation as well. R. 817, 844. 854, 862-63, 1123.
23.

Also on August 20, 2006, the Houcks reported to Deputy Morgan that

Lewis J. Pintar "flipped off Martin Houck and called him an "ass hole." R. 4.
24.

Without conducting an investigation, and without even contacting

Lewis J. Pintar to hear his statements regarding the matter, Deputy Morgan issued
a criminal summons for Lewis J. Pintar to be arrested. R. 4, 5, 818, 854, 862, 94750, 956, 970, 980, 983, 985, 987, 992, 1135, 1292, 1294.
25.

Deputy Morgan issued the criminal summons for arrest even though

the allegations made by the Houcks, even if true, did not constitute a crime. R. 5,
829-30, 1292, 1294.
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26.

On November 2, 2006, Lewis J. Pintar was served with the criminal

summons for arrest by substituted service. R. 5.
27.

Pursuant to the criminal summons, Lewis J. Pintar appeared at the

Utah County Jail where he was arrested for disorderly conduct pursuant to Utah
Criminal Code §76-9-102, booked, fingerprinted, read his Miranda rights, had his
"mug shot" taken. The "mug shot" and the details of the arrest were posted on the
Utah County Jail website on the Internet. R. 1294.
28.

The criminal proceedings were terminated on August 1, 2007, in favor

of Lewis J. Pintar. R. 5-6, 818, 1164.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Trial Court incorrectly ruled that Deputy Morgan was not a
policymaker for Utah County and therefore liability could not attach to Utah
County. Under Utah law, Deputy Morgan has complete autonomy to make an
arrest. This fact, along with the lack of exigency in this matter, establishes that
Deputy Morgan is the sole policymaker for Utah County in the circumstances
presented herein.
The Trial Court incorrectly ruled that Deputy Morgan is entitled to qualified
immunity under the facts presented herein. The Trial Court abused its discretion in
ignoring the fact that Deputy Morgan conducted no investigation in this matter.
The Trial Court also abused its discretion in ignoring the fact that, even if the
16

allegations against Lewis J. Pintar were true, they did not constitute a crime. These
facts, plus the facts and circumstances herein, establish that Deputy Morgan is not
entitled to qualified immunity.
The Trial Court abused its discretion in denying the Pintars' Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Complaint where the Pintars filed their Motion
prior to the agreed-upon deadline and the Houcks had an opportunity to conduct
discovery regarding the issues raised by the proposed Second Amended Complaint.
The Trial Court incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of
Defendants Martin and Darlene Houck. In doing so, the Trial Court erred in
finding that, as a matter of law, the Pintars could not sustain their request for
Declaratory Relief where the Pintars are requesting a Declaration from the Court
that they can irrigate their property in the same manner as they have done for
decades prior to the Houcks purchasing their property, and liability cannot attach if
the irrigation water drains as it has historically done.
The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Houcks
regarding the causes of action for conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, civil
conspiracy and malicious prosecution.

The Trial Court further abused its

discretion in finding that Deputy Morgan conducted a haphazard investigation
where in fact no investigation took place and also by ignoring the fact that even if
the allegations against Lewis J. Pintar were true, they did not constitute a crime.
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Given these and other facts, the Trial Court erred in finding that, as a matter of law,
there could be no meeting of the minds or concerted action between Deputy
Morgan and the Houcks.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEPUTY
MORGAN IS NOT A POLICYMAKER FOR UTAH COUNTY AND
THEREFORE LIABILITY CANNOT ATTACH TO UTAH COUNTY,
Utah County argued before the Trial Court that liability cannot attach to it

through a theory of Respondeat Superior. R. 72. Therefore, in order for liability to
attach to Utah County, the Pintars must show that:

(1) a local government

employee committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that a governmental policy
or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation. Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Utah County claimed
that the Pintars failed to meet this burden. The Pintars agreed that the standard for
liability to attach to Utah County is that set forth in Monell, supra; however, the
Pintars disagreed with Utah County's assertion that they failed to meet that
standard. The Trial Court agreed with Utah County; however, in doing so, it
misapplied the law to the facts set forth herein.
It is undisputed by Utah County and the Trial Court that a governmental
custom or policy may be established by a single policymaker. Pembaur v. City of
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Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). The United States Supreme Court explained its
holding in Pembaur as follows:
. . . At is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single
decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.
No one has ever doubted, for instance, that a municipality may be
liable under §1983 for a single decision by its properly constituted
legislative body—whether or not that body had taken similar action in
the past or intended to do so in the future—because even a single
decision by such a body unquestionably constitutes an act of official
government policy.. ..
But the power to establish policy is no more the exclusive province of
the legislature at the local level than at the state or national level.
MonelVs language makes clear that it expressly envisioned other
officials "whose acts or edicts may fairly be said to represent official
policy." Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at 694, and whose decisions therefore
may give rise to municipal liability under §1983. Indeed, any other
conclusion would be inconsistent with the principles underlying
§1983.
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, supra, at 480 [emphasis added].
It was further undisputed by Utah County and the Trial Court that the identification
of officials having "final policymaking authority" is a question of state (including
local) law.

City of St Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) citing

Pembaur v. Cincinnati, supra, at 483.
Utah County argued that in determining whether a governmental entity can
be liable under §1983 for a single official's act, the Court must look to two (2)
factors: (1) whether his or her discretionary decisions are constrained by other
policies; and (2) whether those decisions are reviewable by others. Milligan-Hitt v.
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Board of Trustees of Sheridan County School District No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1228
(10th Cir. 2008). R. 176. This test was, quite correctly, adopted by the Trial Court,
however, the Trial Court erred distinctly in two fashions in applying the facts to
this test as set forth in Milligan, supra.
The Trial Court found that Deputy Morgan cannot be considered a policy
maker for Utah County because her actions, though discretionary, are still
constrained by other policies and because her decisions are reviewable by others.
R. 205-06. However, the Trial Court, or Utah County for that matter, does not
show how Deputy Morgan's action to arrest Lewis J. Pintar is constrained by any
state policy or how it was reviewable by others. In fact, it is clearly not in either
case.
It is undisputed by Utah County that Utah Code Annotated §17-22-2
(General Duties of Sheriff), subsection (b) authorizes a sheriff to make all lawful
arrests, however, it is silent on what constitutes a lawful arrest. It is undisputed
that it is at the discretion of the sheriff to determine what constitutes a lawful
arrest. Only after the arrest has been made does one have the opportunity through
the Courts to review whether the arrest was proper. However, there is no such
review or constraint prior to the arrest taking place. It is therefore at the discretion
of the single officer to determine County policy as to what constitutes a lawful
arrest before up to and including the point it takes place.
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Utah Code Annotated §77-7-2 (Arrest by Peace Officers) states in pertinent
part: "A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
without warrant, arrest a person when he has reasonable cause to believe the
person has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing
the person may flee, destroy evidence or injure another person." However, again,
this code section leaves it to the discretion of the police officer to determine what
is reasonable or probable cause to make an arrest. There is no constraint or review
regarding the arrest until after the arrest is actually made.
In other words, the decision to arrest Lewis J. Pintar was Deputy Morgan's
and Deputy Morgan's alone. The Trial Court or Utah County have not shown
where Deputy Morgan's decision to make the arrest was subject to a vote by a
superior body of legislators or administrators on behalf of the County. Neither of
them have shown where Deputy Morgan needed the permission of a superior to
make the arrest. Deputy Morgan was not required to notify a superior, the district
attorney, or a Court of competent jurisdiction to have the proposed arrest reviewed
prior to making the arrest. The policymaking authority as to whether or not to
make an arrest is vested directly with the individual officer under Utah law. This
is magnified in the instant case by the fact that there were no exigent
circumstances—it was Deputy Morgan alone who dealt with this matter on behalf
of Utah County over a sixteen month period prior to the arrest. R. 139.
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Indeed, in Milligan-Hitt, supra, a Wyoming schoolteacher sued a school
district and personally named the superintendent for allegedly discriminating
against her by not hiring her for a position based on her sexual orientation. Id. at
1221-23. In holding that the school superintendent was not the final policymaker
in the matter, the Court looked to the fact that it was the school district's board of
trustees who were vested with authority to make personnel decisions under
Wyoming law—it was merely the role of the superintendent to put candidates
forward before the Board of Trustees. Id. at 1227. Using this analysis, it is
impossible as a matter of law to find that Deputy Morgan's decision to arrest
Lewis J. Pintar was constrained by any governmental policy or reviewable by
others.
Secondly, the Trial Court erred in holding that the Pintars brought forth no
allegations that official Utah County policy was unconstitutional. R. 206. As
discussed supra, it is clear that a single individual can make policy for a
governmental entity and liability will attach if that policy is found to violate the
constitutional rights of an individual. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, supra, at 480.
Liability may attach if either (1) if an official follows previously established
unconstitutional policy or (2) that official makes policy which is unconstitutional.
Id. The Trial Court's ruling ignores the latter.
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It is undisputed that the Trial Court must accept all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn from
them in the light most favorable to the Pintars as the non-moving party. Whipple v.
American Fork Irrigation Company, supra at 1219; Russell v. Standard Corp.,
supra at 264. The Pintars alleged in their complaint that Deputy Morgan used her
delegated police power and official position to: (1) deliberately choose not to
conduct even a rudimentary investigation of the allegations against Lewis J. Pintar;
(2) take only statements from the alleged complaining witnesses without
substantiating them; (3) not contact Lewis J. Pintar before making an arrest; (4)
have Lewis J. Pintar arrested, fingerprinted, and booked with his "mug shot" taken
and posted on the Internet; and (5) to do all of these acts or omissions where there
was not even the allegation of a crime. R. 3-6. Viewing these facts as true and all
inferences from them in a light most favorable to the Pintars, it must be concluded
that Deputy Morgan was promulgating the policy of Utah County with regard to
the underlying allegations.
Furthermore, it must be inferred from the facts plead in the Pintars'
complaint that there was a conflict of interest with Deputy Morgan or anyone from
the Utah County Sheriffs Department handling this matter based on the fact that
the complainants' close relative worked there. R. 3. There were no exigent
circumstances surrounding the arrest which would have prevented Deputy Morgan
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from addressing the conflict of interest. R. 139. Therefore, the Trial Court must
conclude that Utah County has no policy regarding inherent conflicts of interest
which may lead to an abridgment of an individual's constitutional rights.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEPUTY
MORGAN IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM THE
PINTARS' SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION
(MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND CONSPIRACY PURSUANT TO
42 U.S.C. $1983).
A.

Factual Error

The Trial Court erred by not accepting the factual allegations of the
Complaint as true and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable
to the Pintars as the nonmoving party.

Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation

Company, supra at 1219; Russell v. Standard Corp., supra at 264. Specifically, the
Pintars clearly plead in their Complaint that, in addition to the allegations being
false, even if the facts as alleged in Deputy Morgan's report were true, they did not
constitute the crime of disorderly conduct as defined by the Utah Criminal Statute.
R. 5. The Pintars also argued this fact in their Opposition to the Utah County
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. R. 143. Despite this, the District Court found as
follows in ruling that Deputy Morgan is entitled to qualified immunity:
"Plaintiffs have alleged that because the allegations that led to their
arrest were false, that Deputy Morgan's actions were unreasonable.
If this premise were true, then any officer who arrested someone
falsely would be liable to that person. This in turn would increase the
burden upon the government and provide a disincentive to officers to
perform their duty under the law." R. 209.
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The Trial Court also ignored the following facts alleged by the Pintars in their
Complaint:
(1) Deputy Morgan verbally threatened the Pintars with criminal sanctions
without probable cause or authority; R. 3, 143.
(2) Deputy Morgan did not even undertake a rudimentary investigation of
the matter to determine if there was any criminal act by Lewis J. Pintar; R. 4, 143.
(3) Deputy Morgan did not even have any contact with Lewis J. Pintar
before filing a police report which caused him to be arrested; R. 4, 143.
(4) Deputy Morgan was aware that the complaining witness's daughter-inlaw worked for the same law enforcement agency. R. 3.
The Trial Court erred in ignoring these facts and replacing them with its own
interpretation that "Plaintiffs have alleged that because the allegations that led to
their arrest were false, that Deputy Morgan's actions were unreasonable." R. 209.
This error is material in that it forms the entire basis for the Trial Court granting
qualified immunity to Deputy Morgan.
B.

Legal Error

The Trial Court cites Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) in
articulating the doctrine of qualified immunity:

"[Government

officials

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
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constitutional rights." Id. at 818. R. 206-07. The Harlow Court relied upon the
"objective reasonableness" of an official's conduct as measured by reference to
clearly established law in determining whether a grant of qualified immunity was
appropriate. Id. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court broke down the
"objective reasonableness" test into two parts for a Court's analysis in considering
a claim for qualified immunity: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, show that the official violated the plaintiffs
constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The Trial Court further cites Saucier in support of
its analysis: "The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 202. The question then
turns on the objective reasonableness of the officer given the circumstances.
While the District Court's recitation of the applicable law is correct, it takes
great liberties with the facts plead by the Pintars in applying the law to them:
"Plaintiffs cite to their Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure and to be subject to arrest only when there is
probable cause. Although a right may be clearly established by the
Constitution, it does not automatically lead to the conclusion that a
defendant's deprivation of that right was unreasonable. The fact that
the charges tendered against the Plaintiffs later turned out to be
unsubstantiated does not make the defendant's actions unreasonable
in light of the circumstances prevailing." R. 209-10. [Emphasis
added].
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The Pintars did not plead that there were charges tendered against Lewis J.
Pintar that later turned out to be unsubstantiated. The Pintars plead and argued that
even if the allegations against Lewis J. Pintar were true, they did not constitute a
crime under Utah law. R. 5, 829-30, 1292. In the instant case the elements of a
crime were not even alleged. This fact alone defeats the assertion that Deputy
Morgan's actions in this matter were not unreasonable. It is clear, as a matter of
law, to a reasonable officer, or any reasonable individual for that matter, that a law
enforcement officer cannot arrest someone without at least the accusation or
suspicion of conduct that constitutes a crime.
The fact that there was not an allegation of a crime in the instant case also
completely distinguishes this case from each case the District Court cites in its
decision. The District Court relies on Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987):
[Although a right may be clearly established in the constitution, it
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the officer's actions
were unreasonable in the circumstances

[I]t is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases
reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present.
Id. at 641. R.208.
However, the instant case is completely distinguishable from Anderson.

In

Anderson, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld qualified immunity for a police officer
who conducted a warrantless search for a bank robber under what he perceived to
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be exigent circumstances in a plaintiffs home. Id. at 637. The key distinction is
that in Anderson, there was at least an accusation of an underlying crime that was
committed—a bank was robbed. Further distinguishing the instant case from
Anderson, is the lack of any exigency. Unlike Anderson, there was no split-second
decision that was required by the officer under the circumstances.

Deputy

Morgan's conduct in this matter was deliberate and concerted over a sixteen month
period. R. 139.
The Trial Court also relies on Beard v. City ofNorthglenn, 24 F.3d 110 (10
Cir. 1994) where qualified immunity was upheld against a Plaintiff who sued an
official who conducted a search regarding a check kiting scheme based on false
information contained in the warrant. Again, in Beard, there was the accusation of
an underlying crime - check kiting. In the instant case, there is not even the
allegation of a crime. R. 5, 829-30, 1292. By definition, if there is no allegation of
a crime, there can be no probable cause to support the arrest of Lewis J. Pintar.
Furthermore, in the absence of an allegation of a crime, it is impossible to argue
that an officer acted reasonably in making an arrest.
In order to confer qualified immunity upon Officer Morgan, there must be a
finding that, as a matter of law, Deputy Morgan acted reasonably in issuing an
arrest warrant for Lewis J. Pintar where: (1) Deputy Morgan verbally threatened
the Pintars with criminal sanctions without probable cause or authority; (2) Deputy
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Morgan did not even undertake a rudimentary investigation of the matter to
determine if there was any criminal act by Lewis J. Pintar; (3) Deputy Morgan did
not even have any contact with Lewis J. Pintar before filing a police report which
caused him to be arrested, (4) a close relative of the complaining witnesses worked
at the same law enforcement agency as Officer Morgan, and (4) the underlying
conduct as alleged, even if true, does not constitute a crime. R. 143. The Pintars
respectfully submit that the District Court cannot meet its burden and therefore
qualified immunity cannot be conferred upon Deputy Morgan.
m.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
THE PINTARS LEAVE TO FILE THEIR SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT,
On August 4, 2009, the parties filed a Stipulated Case Management Order

whereby they agreed to a deadline of October 31, 2009, to amend the pleadings.
R. 356, 361. Prior to that deadline, the Pintars filed and served a Motion for Leave
to File a Second Amended Complaint. The proposed Second Amended Complaint
split the first cause of action for declaratory relief regarding irrigation issues into
three causes of action - one of those being for specific performance rather than
declaratory relief- that more specifically dealt with irrigation issues. R. 338-42.
The parties further stipulated to a discovery cut-off date of December 31, 2009.
R. 356, 361. Despite the discovery cut-off date, the Pintars agreed that the Houcks
could serve their discovery the week of January 11, 2010 and they would answer it
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after on or before March 1, 2010. R. 1295. The Houcks did indeed propound
discovery questions the week of January 11, 2010—some which dealt with the
issues raised in the proposed Second Amended Complaint. R. 1295. The Pintars
intended to respond to those discovery requests. R. 1295.
Despite the fact that the Pintars filed and served their Motion for Leave to
Amend prior to the agreed upon deadline, the District Court denied the Pintars
Motion. R. 1295. The District Court questioned the Pintars' counsel about future
discovery. R. 1295. The Pintars counsel, while indicating that the parties had an
agreement that he would respond to discovery already propounded and that he
would honor that agreement, indicated that he was not agreeable to reopening
discovery entirely. R. 1295. The Court ruled from the bench that the Pintars could
have brought their amendment sooner, therefore, the Court denied the Pintars'
Motion for Leave to Amend. R. 1295. The Court also indicated that because the
Pintars' position was that discovery was closed it denied the Pintars' Motion. R.
1295. In doing so, the Court abused its discretion.
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
A party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires, [emphasis added]
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The courts in Utah have frequently and consistently followed this plain
language. league v. District Court, 528 P.2d 802 (Utah 1974); Fishbaugh v. Utah
Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998). The Utah Supreme Court has held:
When leave of the court is required to amend a pleading, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that "leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires." We have stated, "Courts should be liberal
in allowing amendments to the end that cases may be fully and fairly
presented on their merits."

Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993) quoting Hancock v. Luke, 148
P. 452 (Utah 1915).
The Courts look to three factors in determining whether or not to grant leave
to amend: (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for the delay; and
(3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d
94, 98 (Utah 1981). All three prongs of the analysis weigh in favor of granting the
Pintars leave to amend.
First of all, the parties agreed to a deadline of October 31, 2009 to amend the
pleadings. The Pintars timely met that deadline. There is no reason to establish a
case management plan with deadlines to file documents if a particular pleading
filed prior to a deadline is still found to be untimely. The Pintars relied on this
deadline. It would be inherently unjust for the Trial Court to hold them to a
different deadline.

The Pintars' Motion was filed prior to the deadline and

therefore was timely.
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The Trial Court's reliance on the fact that, aside from the discovery already
propounded by the Houcks, the Pintars considered discovery closed pursuant to
their agreement in the Stipulated Case Management Order is misplaced. This in no
way prejudiced the Houcks. The Motion for Leave to Amend and proposed
Second Amended Complaint were served on the Houcks on October 19, 2009. R.
332-69. They had until December 1, 2009, to propound discovery given the
discovery cut-off of December 31, 2009. R. 356, 361. The Pintars even granted
the Houcks extensions past that date until the week of January 11, 2010, to serve
discovery which they did. R. 1295. It is undisputed that the Houcks propounded
discovery questions that dealt solely with the issues of the proposed Second
Amended Complaint. R. 1295. The Trial Court's position that Defendants had no
opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the proposed Second Amended
Complaint is contradicted by the actual facts. R. 1295. There is no reasonable
basis for the decision of the Trial Court to deny the Pintars Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint; therefore, the Trial Court abused its discretion.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PINTARS'
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AS TO
THE HOUCKS.
The Pintars requested that the Court issue declaratory relief such that, given

the facts and circumstances herein, they be allowed to reasonably irrigate their
agricultural property as they and their predecessors have done for decades prior to
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the Houck Defendants' purchasing the adjoining property. R. 1293. The Trial
Court found that this request is unsustainable as a matter of law given the fact that
water sometimes spills from the higher Pintar property onto the lower Houck
property. The Trial Court erred in reaching this conclusion.
The facts regarding this issue are undisputed. R. 1293. The Pintars owned
their property long before the Houcks purchased the adjoining property. R. 813,
850-51, 859, 1068, 1082. The Pintars irrigated their property in the same manner
for decades prior to the Houcks purchasing their property. R. 851, 859. The Houck
property is lower in elevation. R. 813, 851, 859. There are occasions when the
Pintars properly irrigate their property that water drains from their property onto
the Houck property. R. 1293.
The District Court misstates the request for Declaratory Relief of the Pintars
as being "whether the Pintars are entitled to allow irrigation water to run onto the
Houcks' property." R. 1255. This was never the request. The Pintars' request for
Declaratory Relief is given the facts and circumstances herein, the Pintars be
allowed to irrigate their agricultural property in a reasonable manner as they and
their predecessors have for decades prior to the Houck Defendants purchasing the
adjoining property, and not be held liable for drainage onto the lower Houck
property if they irrigate reasonably. R. 1293.
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In disallowing the Pintars the right to irrigate their property as they have for
decades, the trial court misapplies the law to the facts. Utah law is clear that an
appropriator of water has the right to continue the historical use of water and the
same method of diversion.

Wayment v. Howard, 144 P.3d 1147, 1151 (Utah

2006); Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 114 P. 147, 152 (Utah 1911). The Trial Court
held these cases to be inapplicable because they have to do with "diversion" of
water rather than "use" of water. R. 1256-57. The Trial Court held that "using"
water and "diverting" are not synonymous. The Trial Court reasoned that since
Wayment and Salt Lake City address the diversion of water, they do not apply. R.
1257. However, the District Court contradicts itself by clearly stating that in the
instant case the irrigation water is diverted by the Pintars. R. 1259. Since the facts
are clearly about the diversion of water, the District Court cannot ignore the
precedent set forth in Wayment and Salt Lake City that a landowner has the right to
the historical use of diversion of his water.
Secondly, while the Trial Court correctly cites Sanfordv. University of Utah,
488 P.2d 741, 744 (Utah 1971) in adopting the doctrine of reasonable use for the
discharge of surface waters, R. 1257, it misapplies the doctrine to the instant case.
The Trial Court relies on Erickson v. Bennion, 503 P.2d 139 (1972) quoting Utah
Code Ann. §73-1-8, which provides in pertinent part: "The owner of any ditch . . .
or other watercourse shall maintain the same in repair so as to prevent waste of
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water or damage to the property of others." R. 1258. The issues regarding the
Pintars' request for Declaratory Relief have nothing to do with ditches or
watercourses or the maintenance thereof.

Whether or not the Pintars properly

maintain their ditches or watercourses is not the issue. The issues are strictly
confined to the flood irrigation of the Pintars' property and the drainage thereof.
Finally, the District Court relies on Reeder v. Brigham City, 413 P.2d 300
(1966), and Northpoint Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah & S.L. Canal Co., 52
P. 168, in stating that a landowner has the right to be free from receiving waters on
his lands to his damage which do not find their way in their natural course and
under natural conditions. R. 1259.

However, both of these cases involve

circumstances where the individuals and/or entities in question are moving water
from their land onto another's land. In Reeder the City of Brigham City channeled
an underground system to drain water from an area where new homes were being
built to directly upon the landowner's property. Reeder v. Brigham City, supra, at
301-02. The "aggrieved" landowner in Reeder owned his property before the city
began diverting water onto it—precisely the opposite of the case at bar. Id.

In

Northpoint, the Court held that the Plaintiff therein had the proprietary right to a
canal to use for irrigation purposes and therefore the Defendants therein had no
right to purposefully drain their used irrigation water into said canal for nonirrigation purposes. Northpoint Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah & S.L. Canal
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Co., at 172-73. In the instant case, while the Pintars divert the irrigation water
onto their property, once it is on the Pintar property there nothing artificial that
carries the irrigation water from the Pintars' property to the Houck property. It is
undisputed that the Houck property is lower in elevation than the Pintar property
R. 813, 851, 859., therefore, gravity takes its course.
Finally, in order for a landowner to have the right to be free from receiving
waters on his lands, he must show damages from the water in question. Reeder v.
Brigham City, supra at 302. Even if Reeder, were applicable to the instant case,
the Houcks have not raised the issue in their pleadings or arguments before the
Court that they have been damaged by the water drainage at all. Therefore, the
Trial Court erred in holding that the Pintars request for Declaratory Relief is
legally unsustainable.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PINTARS'
THIRD AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONSPIRACY
PURSUANT TO TITLE 42 U.S.C. $1983 AND CIVIL CONSPIRACY
AS TO THE HOUCKS.
A.

Factual Error

The Trial Court concedes that the question or whether or not there is a
conspiracy is typically a question of fact. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom
Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1448 (lO* Cir. 1995). R. 1262. Despite this, though, the
Trial Court ruled that as a matter of law, there was not a conspiracy between
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Deputy Morgan and the Houcks. R. 1261. In so ruling, the Trial Court committed
reversible error.
In considering a motion for summary judgment and determining whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact for a trier-of-fact to decide, the Trial
Court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,
107 (Utah 1991); Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1990).
Unfortunately, the Trial Court did not construe all facts and reasonable
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The
Pintars specifically plead and argued that there was no investigation of the matter
which was conducted by Deputy Morgan. R. 4, 5, 818, 854, 862, 947-50, 956,
970, 980, 983, 985, 987, 992, 1135, 1294. However, the District Court based its
decision on finding that Deputy Morgan's investigation was "haphazard and
incomplete." R. 1261. Furthermore, the Pintars specifically plead that even if the
facts as alleged against Lewis J. Pintar were true, they did not constitute a crime.
R. 5, 829-30, 1294. The Pintars went into great detail regarding the legislative
history of Utah Criminal Code §76-9-102 (Disorderly Conduct) and how the
allegations herein stated, even if true, could not amount to criminal conduct under
the statute. R. 828-29. However, the Trial Court once again completely ignored
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this fact in its analysis. Furthermore, the Trial Court once again ignored the
following factors in its analysis:
(1) Deputy Morgan verbally threatened the Pintars with criminal sanctions
without probable cause or authority; R. 3.
(2) Deputy Morgan did not even have any contact with Lewis J. Pintar
before filing a police report which caused him to be arrested; R. 4.
(3) Deputy Morgan was aware that the complaining witness's daughter-inlaw worked for the same law enforcement agency. R. 3, 1294.
These factors are material in that the Trial Court states that the facts it
interprets do not support a claim for conspiracy. R. 1261. The Trial Court further
states it cannot infer that there was a meeting of the minds from the evidence it
interprets. R. 1263. However, the Court does not consider whether it would be
reasonable to infer a civil conspiracy between the Houcks and Deputy Morgan
where: (1) there was a great deal of hostility by the Houcks toward the Pintars; R.
819-22, 855-56, 863-65, 1071-74, 1096-1115, 1130; (2) the Houcks' daughter-inlaw worked at the sheriffs department; R. 3, 816, 818-19, 848, 944, 1116-18;
(3) the Houcks informed Deputy Morgan that their daughter-in-law worked at the
sheriffs department; R. 818-19, 834, 854, 862, 929, 1018, 1294; (4) Deputy
Morgan verbally threatened the Pintars with criminal sanctions without probable
cause or authority; R. 3-4, 81-17, 853, 861; (5) Deputy Morgan did not even
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undertake a rudimentary investigation of the matter nor contact Lewis J. Pintar to
determine if there was any criminal act by Lewis J. Pintar; R. 4, 5, 818, 854, 862,
947-50, 956, 970, 980, 983, 985, 987, 992, 1135, 1294; (6) the underlying conduct
as alleged, even if true, does not constitute a crime. R. 5, 829-30, 1294.
Given these facts, it would certainly be reasonable for a jury to conclude that
Deputy Morgan acted in concert with the Houcks to deprive Lewis J. Pintar of his
right to be free from unreasonable seizure. This is especially true where the Pintars
are only required to produce "facts tending to show an agreement and concerted
action" rather than an actual agreement by direct evidence. Beedles v. Wilson, All
F.3d 1059, 1073 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). "Although a conspiracy may
be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence, it is usually susceptible
of no other proof than that of circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of a
conspiracy is ordinarily in the possession and control of the alleged conspirators
and is seldom attainable." 15A Corpus Juris Secundum, Conspiracy §37.
B.

Legal Error

The District Court correctly cites the relevant five-part test as to whether a
civil conspiracy exists. In order to prove civil conspiracy, the following five
elements must be shown: (1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object
to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action,
(4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof.
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Peterson v. Delta Air lines, Inc., 42 P.3d 1253, 1257 (Utah 2002) citing Alta Indus,
v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1290 (Utah 1993). In finding that, as a matter of law, the
Pintars cannot sustain a cause of action for civil conspiracy against Martin and
Darlene Houck, the Court held that the Pintars failed the third prong of the test by
not alleging facts which show that there was a meeting of the minds. R. 1263. In
so ruling, the Trial Court errs.
The Trial Court liberally construes Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co.,
293 P.2d 700 (1956) in claiming that it is not obligated to assume any asserted
inferences by the Pintars. The Trial Court's position is misplaced. First of all, it
has been well settled through the decades subsequent to Holland, supra, that in
reviewing a matter for summary judgment, a court must accept all factual
allegations as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn from
them. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., supra, at 107; Allen v. Ortez, supra, at 1309.
Allowing the District Court to ignore reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
Pintars' allegations would contradict well-established precedent. Secondly, the
District Court misreads the holding of Holland. In Holland, the Court actually
considered the inferences of the facts alleged by the Plaintiffs therein; however, the
Court concluded that it could not reasonably make the inferences therefrom that
the Plaintiffs desired. Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., supra, at 701-02.
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The Holland Court does not at all excuse the Trial Court from considering the
reasonable inferences from the facts alleged.
Moreover, the District Court concentrates its analysis on a conspiracy that
involves Deputy Morgan, the Houcks' daughter-in-law (Tonya Houck), and Martin
Houck and Darlene Houck. The District Court finds that pivotal to the Pintars
allegations of conspiracy is the alleged relationship between Deputy Morgan and
Tonya Houck. R. 1263. Because Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck testified at
their respective depositions that they did not know each other personally, the Trial
Court reasoned that there could be no meeting of the minds and therefore no
conspiracy. R. 1263.
In fact, the relationship between Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck is not
pivotal to the Pintars5 causes of action for conspiracy. The Pintars plead that
Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck had a personal and friendly working
relationship which influenced Deputy Morgan's decisions. R. 3. The Pintars also
plead in the alternative that Deputy Morgan acted in concert with Martin Houck
and Darlene Houck - with no involvement from Tonya Houck. R. 5, 1294. This
was argued by the Pintars in their opposition, R. 1294; however, it was completely
ignored in the Court's analysis. If the Court had considered this allegation and
applied the standard that the Pintars need only show facts tending to show an
agreement pursuant to Beedles v. Wilson, the Court would not have concluded as a
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matter of law that there could be no finding of a meeting of the minds and
conspiracy between Deputy Morgan and the Houcks.
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED DISMISSING THE PINTARS'
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
PURSUANT TO TITLE 42 U.S.C. §1983 AS TO THE HOUCKS.
The District Court did not dismiss the Pintar's Second Cause of Action on

the basis that the Pintars failed to meet any one of the elements required to
establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C.
§1983. Instead, the District Court dismissed the Pintars' cause of action for
malicious prosecution against Martin and Darlene Houck because the District
Court found that the Pintars did not show that the Houcks acted "under color of
state law." R. 1264. In doing so, the District Court's analysis is flawed in the
same manner as its analysis of the Pintars' conspiracy cause of action.
In order to hold a private individual liable for malicious prosecution
pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must show that the private defendant
participated in joint action with the State or its agents Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
24, 27-28 (1980). The Trial Court is correct in pointing out that the pleadings must
present facts tending to show an agreement and concerted action. R. 1265. As set
forth above, this is precisely what the Pintars plead; however, the District Court did
not take into consideration material facts that the Pintars plead.
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The District Court held that the only evidence that the Houcks acted in
concert or agreement with a state actor is their complaints to the Utah County
Sheriffs Office. R. 1265. This ignores the facts as plead and argued by the
Pintars as set forth above, specifically, that the Pintars specifically plead that
Deputy Morgan and the Houcks acted in concert to have Lewis J. Pintar
wrongfully arrested in violation of his constitutional right to be free thereof. R. 5.
Since there is no dispute as to the Pintars' contention that the elements of
malicious prosecution pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 are satisfied, the Pintars
submit that the analysis regarding whether a trier of fact could reasonably conclude
concerted action and an agreement between Deputy Morgan and the Houcks given
the facts as plead and argued by the Pintars is the same as that for the conspiracy
causes of action. The Pintars will therefore not repeat those arguments here.
However, those arguments demonstrated that the Trial Court erred in dismissing
the Pintars' cause of action for malicious prosecution pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C.
§1983 as to the Houcks.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse and remand the
District Court's decisions to:
(1)

Dismiss the Second Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution

pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Third Cause of Action for Conspiracy
pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 as to Utah County;
(2)

Dismiss the Second Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution

pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Third Cause of Action for Conspiracy
pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to Deputy Morgan;
(3)

Deny the Pintars leave to file their proposed Second Amended

Complaint;
(4)

Dismiss the First Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief as to the

Houcks;
(5)

Dismiss the Second Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution

pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, Third Cause of Action for Conspiracy pursuant
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to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Fourth Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy as to the
Houcks.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

LEWIS J. PINTAR and AFTON B. PINTAR,
Plaintiffs,

1 Date: August 20,2008
vs.
MARTIN HOUCK, DARLENE HOUCK,
TONYA HOUCK, SUSAN MORGAN,
COUNTY OF UTAH, and DOES 2-50,

Case No.: 070403245
Judge: Gary D. Stott

Defendants.

On March 25% 2008, defendants Tonya Houck, Susan Morgan and Utah County ("Utah
County Defendants*') filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' State Law Claims with supporting
memorandum, a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs* Section 1983 Claims with supporting memorandum,
and a Motion to Bifurcate the proceedings. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs* State Law Claims is
based on Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims is based on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Motion to
Bifurcate is based on Rule 42(b).
Plaintiffs Lewis J. Pintarand Afton B, Pintar ("Plaintiffs") filed their Oppositions to the three
motions on May 13, 2008. Utah County Defendants filed their memoranda in reply on June II,
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2008, along with requests to submit for decision. The court heard oral arguments on all throe
motions on July 21,2008. The court now issues this memorandum decision and grants Utah County
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court "must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor/' Mounteer v. Utah
Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). In that light, the Court sets forth the facts
of the case.
Plaintiffs live in Spanish Fork, Utah, and share a boundary line with defendants Martin
and Darlene Houck ("the Houcks"). Plaintiffs and the Houcks both have rights to irrigation
water administered by Westfield Irrigation Company. Over the past several years, disagreements
have arisen between Plaintiffs and the Houcks regarding the management of the water rights.
These disagreements have led to hostility between the parties.
Tonya Houck, who is the daughter-in-law of the Houcks and works as a secretary at the
Utah County SherifFs Office, has a personal and friendly working relationship with Deputy
Susan Morgan ("Deputy Morgan"), who is also employed by the Utah County Sheriffs Office.
On May 12,2006, Deputy Morgan contacted Plaintiff Aflon Pintar and issued a verbal
criminal injunction to the Plaintiffs to stop all contact with the Houcks. Deputy Morgan took
this action without following proper procedure and without consulting her superiors at Utah
County. Deputy Morgan also did not disclose to her superiors her friendship with Tonya Houck.
Page 2 of 18

Deputy Morgan took this action on the basis of complaints presumably made by someone in the
Houck family about the water issues between Plaintiffs and the Houcks and threats allegedly
made by Plaintiffs' son to the Houcks. Deputy Morgan issued this criminal injunction under
penalty of criminal prosecution.
On May 14, 2006, Deputy Morgan took another informal, undocumented report thai
Plaintiff Lewis Pintar had improperly gestured at the Houcks from his property as the Houcks
drove by. Neither Deputy Morgan nor any other representative of the Utah County Sheriff's
Office contacted Plaintiff Lewis Pintai- about the allegations that gave rise to the actions taken by
Deputy Morgan on May 12,2006, and May 14, 2006.
On June 11,2006, and July 4,2006, Deputy Morgan received information regarding two
other incidents between Plaintiffs and the Houcks, wherein it was alleged that Plaintiff Lewis
Pintar made derogatory comments about the Houcks in their presence. Deputy Morgan did not
document these incidents until a later date. Deputy Morgan did not contact the Plaintiffs
regarding these incidents, nor did Deputy Morgan review the matter with supervisors or county
attorneys. On August 20,2006, Deputy Morgan received a call from Martin Houck, who
complained that Plaintiff Lewis Pintar allegedly called him an "asshole" and flipped him off
from the Plaintiffs' property. Deputy Morgan prepared a written summary of the incident and
detailed the history of the dealings between the parties, but she did not contact the Plaintiffs.
The claims made by the Houcks accusing the Plaintiffs of inappropriate conduct are false.
On August 20, 2006, Deputy Morgan referred the matter to the Utah County Attorney's
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Office for the institution of a criminal prosecution against Plaintiff Lewis Pintar, charging
disorderly conduct. On October 30,2006, the Utah County Attorney's Office received the oneand-a-half page narrative of Deputy Morgan and issued a criminal summons and filed an
information against Plaintiff Lewis Pintar for disorderly conduct Plaintiff Lewis Pintar was
served with the summons by substitute service on November 2,2006. The commencement of
the criminal matter required the appearance of Plaintiff Lewis Pintar at the Utah County Jail for
booking, fingerprinting, photo, and arrest. This information was made public both as a matter of
public record and the posting of Plaintiff Lewis Pintar's picture and booking information on the
Utah County Jail website. Plaintiff Lewis Pintar retained counsel in the matter. The Utah
County Attorney's Office made a motion to dismiss the case which was granted on August 1,
2007, based on the lack of evidence to support the charges.
Plaintiffs served a notice of claim on Utah County on November 1,2007, On the same
day, November 1,2007, Plaintiffs filed their complaint naming as defendants Martin Houck,
Darlene Houck, Tonya Houck, Susan Morgan, Kay Bryson, Timothy Barnes, and Does 1-50.
Plaintiffs brought eleven causes of action, including a request for declaratory relief, and claims
for malicious prosecution under section 1983, conspiracy under section 1983, civil conspiracy,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation,
negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation. On February 14, 2008, Plaintiffs
amended their complaint to include Utah County as a defendant since 60 days had elapsed since
they had served their notice of claim on Utah County and had received no response.
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DISCUSSION
I- MOTION TO DISMISS STATE LAW CLAIMS
The court grants Utah County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' State Law
Claims. Plaintiffs brought six state law causes of action against Utah County Defendants: civil
conspiracy, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation ("state law claims").
As argued by Utah County Defendants, Plaintiffs failed to strictly comply with the requirements
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"), which deprives this court of subject matter
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' state law claims against Utah County Defendants.
A. Notice of Claim under UGIA
The UGIA requires that a person having a claim against a governmental entity or an
employee of that entity must file a notice of claim. Specifically, UGIA's notice requirement
provides:
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee for
an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with
the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving
rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(I) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted;
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as
provided in Subsection 63G-7-202(3)©, the name of the employee.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(2)-(3) (2008) (previously section 63-30d-401). In addition,
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section 63G-7-4G2 requires that a claimant file a notice of claim "with the person and according
to the requirements of Section 63G-7-401 within one year after the claim arises...-" Utah Code
Ann, § 63G-7-402. If the governmental entity denies the claim or fails to respond within 60 days
of the claim being filed, "a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the
governmental entity or an employee of the entity." Id. at § 63G-7-403(2)(a), Plaintiffs have
failed to meet several of the requirements embodied in the notice statute. The court will address
the dispositive provisions of UGIA supporting its decision to grant Utah County Defendants'
motion.
1» Claim against an employee
Subsection (2) of section 63G-7-401 requires that a person having a claim against an
employee of a governmental entity must file a written notice of claim with the entity before
maintaining an action if the employee was acting during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority. Id. at § 63G-7-401 (2).
Initially, Plaintiffs argued that Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck were acting outside the scope
of their employment, and the notice requirements of UGIA were therefore inapplicable.
However, Plaintiffs conceded on the record at oral arguments that Deputy Morgan and Tonya
Houck were acting at least under color of authority, which renders any claims against them
subject to the notice requirements of UGIA.
Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Claim with the Utah County Clerk on October 31, 2007.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint naming Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck as defendants on
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November 1, 2007, without waiting for Utah County to approve or deny their claims against
Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck or for the expiration of the 60 days. Therefore, Plaintiffs
failed to comply with the notice requirements of section 63G-7-401(2). Plaintiffs' argument that
there is still time to correct the defective Notice is without merit and is discussed in further detail
below.
2. Nature of the claim asserted
As noted above, the notice of claim must set forth the nature of the claim asserted. Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(ii). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the
notice requirement is to allow the governmental entity "an opportunity to correct the condition
that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of
litigation." Houghton v, Dep 't of Health, 2005 UT 63, P20. The provision requiring a claimant
to set forth the nature of the claim asserted mandates "enough specificity in the notice to inform
as to the nature of the claim so that the defendant can appraise its potential liability." Yearsley v.
Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990).
Plaintiffs rely on Peeples v. State of Utah, 2004 UT App 328, 100 P.3d 254, for the
assertion that their notice of claim was sufficient in setting forth the nature of the claim because
a claimant is not required to exceed the requirements of the UGIA. The court disagrees. In
Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 1 J, P13, 155 P.3d 900, the Utah Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiffs' notice of claim was inadequate because in setting forth the nature of the
claim, they listed breach of contract, section 1983 claims and other causes of action. The court
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found that this notice of claim failed to give the defendant notice of potential claims for
intentional interference with economic relations. Id. at PI 3,
Here, in the section setting forth the nature of their claims, Plaintiffs recited allegations
concerning failure to implement and enforce rules, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy.
Plaintiffs never actually stated that they have a claim for "malicious prosecution," as such, nor
did they mention anywhere in sections setting forth the facts or the nature of the claims asserted
that they had potential claims for defamation, misrepresentation, or infliction of emotional
'distress. Despite Plaintiffs' argument that it is "well-known to Utah County and/or its insurer
that Defamation, Negligent and Intentional Misrepresentation, and Negligent and Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress arise out of circumstances associated with wrongful arrest,
malicious prosecution and conspiracy," the court concludes that Plaintiffs' notice of claim failed
to adequately set forth the nature of the claims asserted. As noted above, the notice of claim is
intended to give enough specificity to the governmental entity so that it can ascertain its potential
liability. Plaintiffs' notice of claim identifying only malicious prosecution and conspiracy failed
to give enough specificity to Utah County to ascertain its potential liability on the claims for
defamation, misrepresentation, or infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to
strictly comply with the requirement of UGIA setting forth the nature of the claims asserted with
respect to defamation, misrepresentation, and infliction of emotional distress and these claims
are subsequently barred,
3. Time to correct or file new notice of claim
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In addition to the requirements of section 63G-7-401, UGIA requires that the notice of
claim be filed "within one year after the claim arises

" Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-402. All of

Plaintiffs' state law claims are tort causes of action. As noted by Utah County Defendants, "[a]
tort cause of action accrues when all its elements come into being and the claim is actionable."
Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992).
Utah County Defendants argue that the elements of all the state law claims accrued on
November 2,2006, the day that Plaintiff Lewis Pintar was served with the criminal summons
because the alleged defamatory statements, misrepresentations and emotional distress inflicted
by Tonya Houck, Deputy Morgan, and Utah County happened prior to Lewis Pintar being served
with the criminal summons. Plaintiffs argue that their claims accrued on August 1, 2007, the
date on which the criminal action was terminated in Lewis Pintar's favor. Plaintiffs assert that
since the cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the action is terminated
in a plaintiffs favor, they have until August I, 2008, to file a notice of claim against Utah
County.
Plaintiffs5 reliance on accrual of the elements of malicious prosecution is misplaced, as
noted by Utah County Defendants. Plaintiffs brought their malicious prosecution cause of action
under section 1983, so it is not subject to the one-year time limit of UGIA. The one-year time
limit imposed by section 63G-7-4Q2 began to run when the elements of civil conspiracy,
infliction of emotional distress, defamation and misrepresentation accrued. Because the Utah
County Attorneys were dismissed from the lawsuit, the actions constituting the elements of these
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torts must have been taken by Tonya Houck or Deputy Morgan and not the Utah County
Attorneys.
The court concludes that any actions allegedly constituting defamation, infliction of
emotional distress, misrepresentation and conspiracy were taken by Tonya Houck and Deputy
Morgan prior to Lewis Pintar being served with the criminal summons on November 2, 2006.
Therefore, Plaintiffs had until November 2, 2007, to file a proper notice of claim against Utah
County for their state law claims. However, even if the court were to accept the date argued by
Plaintiffs as the date the causes of action accrued, Plaintiffs likewise failed to file a proper notice
of claim on Utah County by August 1,2008, and are therefore barred from filing a notice of
claim against Utah County under section 63G-7-402.
Because Plaintiffs' notice of claim was filed prematurely, did not adequately identify the
nature of the claims asserted, and the time to file a proper notice of claim has expired, the court
hereby grants Utah County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' State Law Claims.
II, MOTION TO DISMISS SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
The court grants Utah County Defendants* Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983
claims- Plaintiffs brought claims for malicious prosecution and conspiracy under section 1983
("section 1983 claims"). As argued by Utah County Defendants, Plaintiffs failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted due to the lack of municipal liability for the discretionary
actions of its officers. There is not relief under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of
a municipality's employees. Additionally, Utah County Defendants may claim relief under
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qualified immunity for discretionary actions where the officers did not clearly know their actions
were violative of the law. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Section 1983 Claims must therefore
be granted.
A. Liability of Municipality under Section 1983
Vicarious liability through a §1983 violation may not be imposed on a governing body
merely by the existence of an employer/employee relationship. Aldiough foreclosing relief
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the United States Supreme Court held that a
government municipality may be sued under §1983 when official municipal policy or custom is
the "moving force" behind the constitutional violation and the tortious acts of its employees.
Monell v. New York CityDep 7 of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The importance of
their holding is to distinguish the acts of an employee from the acts of the municipality, thereby
limiting municipal liability to actions "for which the municipality is actually responsible"- those
which they have sanctioned or ordered. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati^ 475 U.S. 469,479-80
(1986).

Although there must be a "direct causal link between the municipal policy or custom and
the alleged constitutional deprivation," City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989), in
Pembaur, the Supreme Court found that a municipal policy or custom may be established "by a
single decision by municipal policymakers'' if it was made under certain circumstances. 475
U.S. at 480. The Court clarified by stating that the decision must be said to reflect the
municipality's official policy. Id. "Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker
Page 11 of 18

possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. The
fact that a particular official,.. has discretion in the exercise of a particular function does not^
without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion." Id. at 482.
In the case of a decision on a single occasion, a municipality is responsible only for
actions taken by final policymakers whose conduct may be said to represent official policy.
Simons v. Uintah Special Services District, 506 F.3d 1281,1286 (10th Cir. 2007). Although the
identification of policymaking officials is a question of state law, (St Louis v. Praproinik, 485
U.S. 112 (1988)), there are primarily two factors that a court will consider: 1) whether his/her
discretionary decisions are constrained by other policies, and 2) whether those decisions are
reviewable by others. Milligan-Hitt v. Board of Treasurers of Sheridan County No. 2, 523 J?.3d
1219,1228 (10th Cir. 2008). "When an official's discretionary decisions are constrained by
policies not of that official's making, those policies, rather than the subordinate's departure from
them, are the act of the municipality." Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127.
Plaintiffs argue that Deputy Morgan may be considered a policymaker for the State of
Utah because she made a unilateral decision within her discretion with regards to the arrest and
subsequent prosecution of plaintiffs. However, the defendants in question did not act according
to official pplicy, nor could their actions be construed to represent official policy. Deputy
Morgan cannot be considered a policy maker for Utah County because her actions, though
discretionary, are still constrained by other policies, and because her decisions are reviewable by
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others. Plaintiffs have brought forth no allegations that official Utah County policy was
unconstitutional, and in the absence of evidence that Deputy Morgan's actions constituted
official policy, or that her decisions were reviewed and ratified by those having official policy
making authority, the Plaintiffs claims against the Defendants for a Section 1983 violation
cannot stand.
B. Absolute Immunity of Tonya Houck
Tonya Houck is a secretary in the Judicial Services Division of Utah County. Although
she is not a court clerk, Utah County Defendants argue that many of her functions and duties as a
secretary in Judicial Services may be considered the functional equivalent of a court clerk.
Defendants have argued that inasmuch as those duties were involved in the case before the court,
she may be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Ambus v. Utah State Board of Education, 858
P.2d 1372,1382 (Utah 1993). However, this Court finds this argument tenuous and focuses its
attention on the qualified immunity claims discussed below which form a more substantial basis
for the court's decision.
C. Qualified Immunity of Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck
Utah County Defendants argue that Tonya Houck and Deputy Susan Morgan are entitled
to qualified immunity as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982). In Harlow, the Court affirmed its holding from prior cases that
"governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
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for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights." Id. at 818. In reaching this holding, the Court briefly discussed the
history of the qualified immunity doctrine, noting that it was established in an attempt to balance
the need for vindicating constitutional guarantees with the need for terminating insubstantial
lawsuits and minimizing the societal cost that results from suits against government officials. Id
at 814. In a later case, Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986), the Court explained, "As the
qualified immunity defense has evolved,, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
When analyzing a claim of qualified immunity on the part of a governmental defendant, a
court must initially consider two factors: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, show that the official violated the plaintiffs constitutional right, and
(2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In
explaining what it means for a right to be clearly established, the United States Supreme Court in
Saucier stated, "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly
established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted." Id, at 202. The court cited to an earlier U.S. Supreme Court case,
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999), in which the court stated that "the right allegedly
violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it
was clearly established/' The Saucier court further explained that "(i]f the law did not put the
officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on
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qualified immunity is appropriate. A later Supreme Court case explained that the particular
action in question did not have to previously have been held to be unlawful, but "in the light of
pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the action must be apparent." Anderson v. Creighion* 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
In Anderson, a police officer conducted a warrantless search for a suspect in the
plaintiffs home on what he perceived to be exigent circumstances. 483 U.S. 635. The suspect
was not found and the plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that their Fourth Amendment right to be free
of unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. Id. The Supreme Court explained that
although a right may be clearly established in the Constitution, it does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the officer's actions were unreasonable in the circumstances. Id, at 641. The
Court recognized that "it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases
reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in
such cases those officials • . . should not be held personally liable." Id. The Court concluded by
stating that the general rule behind qualified immunity is to provide government officials with
the ability to reasonably anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability so that as long as
their actions are reasonable, they may not fear to act. Id. at 646 (citing Davis v. Scherer% 468
U.S. 163, 195(1984)).
In a case similar to that at bar, the plaintiff sued the defendant officers under a Section
1983 violation for arresting the plaintiff on the false assumption that he was involved in a check
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kiting scheme. Beard v. City ofNorthglenn, 24 R3d 110 (10th Cir, 1994). The plaintiff claimed
the warrant contained false information which the officers failed to adequately investigate. Id. at.
114. The Tenth Circuit defended the defendant's qualified immunity and reaffirmed that a
constitutional violation does not occur merely because later events demonstrate the arrested
person is innocent. Id. The courtfurther reiterated the established principle that negligence
cannot form the basis of a constitutional violation. Id. at 115.
Plaintiffs have alleged that because the allegations that led to their arrest were false, that
Deputy Morgan's actions were unreasonable. If this premise were true, then any officer who
arrested someone falsely would be liable to that person. This in turn would increase the burden
upon the government and provide a disincentive to officers to perform their duty under the law.
Qualified immunity was established to protect officers from liability for actions that were
objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Certainly this creates a more difficult, though
not impossible hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome when they sue a government official.
Under the established qualified immunity framework, Plaintiffs must allege facts
showing that Houck and Morgan violated Plaintiffs* constitutional rights that were clearly
established such that a reasonable officer would know that the conduct engaged in by Houck and
Morgan was clearly unlawful. Plaintiffs cite to their Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure and to be subject to arrest only when there is probable cause. Although a
right may be clearly established by the Constitution, it does not automatically lead to the
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conclusion that a defendant's deprivation of that right was unreasonable. The fact that the
charges tendered against the Plaintiffs later turned out to be unsubstantiated does not make the
defendant's actions unreasonable in light of the circumstances then prevailing. And as the
Supreme Court reiterated in Anderson, "it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in
some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have
indicated that in such cases those officials > *. should not be held personally liable." 483 U.S. at
641. Utah County Defendants are thus entitled to qualified immunity.
Because Utah County is not vicariously liable under section 1983 and Tonya Houck and
Deputy Morgan are entitled to qualified immunity, the court grants Utah County Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs* Section 1983 Claims.
m . MOTION TO BIFURCATE
Based upon the court's decision to grant Utah County Defendants' motions to dismiss,
the Motion to Bifurcate is rendered moot.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Utah County Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
State Law Claims and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs* Section 1983 Claims are hereby
GRANTED. Based on this decision, the Motion to Bifurcate is rendered moot. Counsel for
Utah County Defendants shall prepare an appropriate order consistent with this opinion for
signature by the court.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEWIS J. PINTAR and AFTON B. PINTAR,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,
Date: May 7,2010
vs.
MARTIN HOUCK, DAPXENE HOUCK,
TONYA HOUCK, SUSAN MORGAN, KAY
BRYSON, TIMOTHY BARNES, UTAH
COUNTY, and DOES 2-50, inclusive,

Case No.: 070403245
Judge: David N. Mortensen

Defendants.

This matter comes before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
("Defendant's Motion"). Upon review of the entire matter, including a supplemental telephone
conference with counsel, the motion is granted for the following reasons.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These are the facts construed in favor of the plaintiffs. In reviewing plaintiffs'
opposition, the following facts reflect either those facts which were expressly undisputed or facts
where the alleged dispute was not material. See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(... No
genuine issue as to any material fact

). Any facts to which there is a genuine dispute are

stated as plaintiffs assert them to be. Plaintiffs and defendants own adjoining property in
Spanish Fork, Utah. They each own rights to irrigation water, administered by the Westfield
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Irrigation Company, that flows onto'their respective properties. There had been a history of
flooding, or at least a voluntary release, of the Pintars* irrigation water onto the Houcks'
property. On July 8, 2004 Mr. Houck Sent Mr. Pintar a letter stating that irrigation water from
Mr. Pmtar's property had beenfloodingMr. Houck's corrals and driveway and asking him*to
contain this water. Plaintiffs maintain that the defendants have falsely asserted thq.t plaintiffs
improperly managed the irrigation water on their property in a way that caused flooding and
damage to the Houck property. Because of this, plaintiffs seek a qleclaratoiy judgment
concerning the management of the irrigation water between<the properties.
Due to the previous flooding issues and the July 8, 2004 letter, tension developed
between plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs allege that on May 12,2006 Mr. Houck entered the
Pintar's property and yelled and cursed at Mrs. Pintar, accusing her of stealing his irrigation
water. The Pintars' son, Nicholas Pintar, heard this altercation and confronted Mr. Houck.
Following the confrontation with Nicholas Pintar, the Houcks contacted the Utah County
Sheriffs Department and reported the incident. Deputy Susan Morgan went tp the Houcks*
house and took a report of the confrontation. She was told about the longstanding hostility
between the families. Deputy Morgan later went to the Pintars' house and told Mrs, Pintar that
Mr, Pintar was not to have contact with the Houcks.
On August 20,2006, the Houcks again contacted the Utah County Sheriffs Office. They
reported that on June 11,2006 Mr. Pintar said, "There go the monkees [sic]" as they walked by
and that at a 4th of July flag-raising ceremony Mr. Pintar shook his finger at them and made
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derogatory remarks. Plaintiffs: deny that these incidents ever happened. Based on these-reports
and the reports of May 12th, Deputy Morgan issued a criminal summons for disorderly conduqt
against Mr. Pintar* According to the plaintiffs, Mr. Pintar appeared at the Utah CQunty jm\ and
was booked. The'criminal proceedings were eventually 'terminated in his favor.
Plaintiffs claim that Deputy Morgan was motivated to issue the criminal citation because
of her relationship with the Houck9 s daughter, Tonya Houck. Tonya Roucfc works for the Utah
County Sheriffs Office, the same law enforcement agency where Deputy Morgan works.
Plaintiffs claim that the Houcks made Deputy Morgan aware of this fact when she visited them
on May 12,2006 and that the Defendants had called their daughter that same day regarding the
confrontation with Nicholas Pintar. There is no specific evidence, or even a specific assertion,
that Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan ever communicated with each other in any way.
Defendants quote the depositions of both Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan in their
motion, and plaintiffs affirm that these quotes are true recitations. In the depositions, both
Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck are asked if they know one another. They both state that they
have heard of one another in connection with their employment, but they have not ever spoken
with one another or met face to face. Plaintiffs do not contest the veracity of the representations
made in the depositions, they simply state that these representations are evidence that Tonya
Houck and Deputy Morgan know one another. This is the totality of the facts available on the
issue. Plainiffs insist that the court can infer a conspiracy from these facts and that on this
meager evidentiary basis the matter should be submitted to a jury.
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Oil .November J, 2007,-Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Martin, Darlene-, and Tpnya.
Houck; Deputy Morgan; Utpb County; andUt^h County Attorney Kay Bxyson and Deputy
County Attorney Timothy Barnes, alleging eleven causes of action under federal and^tate law,1*
The claims against defendants Kay Brysoi*, Timothy Barnes, Utah County, .Deputy Morgan, sad
Tonya Houck were dismissed "by prior order of the court,Judge Gary Stott presiding. Plaintiffs
sought leave to file? a secpnd^amended complaint October* 20,2009. This request was denied
Plaintiffs also allege .that during the pendency of these proceedings, years after the initial
andfirstamended complaints were filed, Mrs. Houck-again called the Utah County Sheriffs
Office to report that someone-in a grey Nissan had sped toward her and then turned into the
Pintars' driveway and that she was afraid that the Pintars were trying to "take her out." Also
while this suit has been pending, Mrs. Houck has filed complaints with the Utah Bar Office of
Professional Conduct against plaintiffs5 counsel. Plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Houck made several
false and defamatory statements in these complaints m regard to the Pintars.
Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment regarding the management and distribution of
irrigation waters between the two properties. They bring federal claims of malicious prosecution
and conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 83. Their state law causes of action include civil
conspiracy, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, negligent

*The initial complaint was amended shortly after it was filed by a three paragraph
pleading which purported to substitute Utah County as a named defendant in lieu of a John Doe
and asserting that notice of claim had been filed by plaintiffs. As these amendments are
irrelevant to the issues presented in this motion, the focus of the court is on the initial complaint.
Page 4 of 27

misrepresentation and intentional misrepresentation concerning the Houcks' statements to the
Utah County Sheriffs GfEtee and the Utah county Attorney's Office, and negligent and
intentional misrepresentation concerning the Houcks' assertion in the July 8,2004 letter.
Defendants move for summary judgment on all .of these causes of action.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
L SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Pursuant Jo^Utah Rule' of Civil Procedure 56; "Summary judgment is appropriate only
when there is nb genuine issue'as to any material fact and the moving party* is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law/' Oman v. Davis School Dist, 2008 UT 70, % 14. This court must
view "all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." RQbinson v.
Mount Logan Clinic, LLC> 2008 UT 21, f 2. However, to successfully defend against amotion
for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present sufficient facts to meet the essential
elements of that party's case* Christiansen v Union Pac. R ft. Co., 2006 UT App 180, % 6. In
other words, when a motion for summary judgment is brought and properly supported, the party
against whom the motion is made is called upon to bring fortli all the evidence they are aware of,
or at least sufficient evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact. When the opposing party
proffers either no evidence or insufficient evidence in the face of a summary judgment motion,
the court may fairly conclude that no such evidence exists or would exist at trial
IL DECLARATORY RELIEF
Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment cause of action presents a quandary for the court. While
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.this court cannot dismiss "this cause of action on summary judgment on the*basis alleged by the
defendants; the review of this*matter left the>co.urt with serious doubts as to whether a trial will,
serve any purpose on this issue. For this reason, the Gonrt conducted a supplemental telephonic
^hearing with, counsel in order to examine counsel (or "interrogate" as the rule states) within the
purview of rule 56(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Having done so, this conrt
concludes-as the parties expressly stated on the record in the telephonic bearing-that n o issue of
fact exists. Further, this court concludes that plaintiffs are not entitled to tfcs relief they seejc,as a.
matter of law. Aocotdingly^ summary judgment must be granted on this claim.
The prayer for relief in plaintiffs complaint is silent on the issue of a declaratory
judgment action. Unlike most declaratory judgment actions, plaintiffs' complaint does not state
anywhere with any particularity what judgment plaintiff wants declared. The declaratory
judgment action, denominated as the first cause of action, first incorporates paragraphs 1 through*
32 of the complaint. However, the majority of paragraphs 1 through 32 have little relationship to
the declaratory jiidgment action. Paragraph 3 indicates that the plaintiffs and defendants share a
boundary line and both have certain rights to irrigation water administered by Westfield
Irrigation Company. Paragraph 13 alleges that the plaintiffs and the defendants, as adjoining
landowners and shareholders in Westfield Irrigation Company, are required to cooperate in
regard to the use and management of irrigation water. Plaintiffs maintain they haye cooperated
at all times in managing irrigation water under their control and allowing defendants the use of
the irrigation water at appropriate and designated times.
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Paragraph 14 of the complaint alleges that Defendants have falsely asserted that Plaintiffs
have improperly managedirrigation water causingfloodingand damage to the defense property.
Plaintiffs have denied-the&e assertions and claimed that any problems, or the various problems,
that the Defendantsrhave had withflooding6r the management of irrigation water have resulted
in the failure of the Defendants to comply with the Established procedures of the water cpmpany
for the water shareholders in the area. Paragraph 34 of thexomplaint alleges the plaintiffs and
defendants "have certain rights and obligations under the statutes and laws of tiw state of Utah,
In addition; plaintiffs and defendants..., as shareholders in the Westfield Irrigation Co., fcaxe
certainrights,obligations and duties with regard to the management and distribution of irrigation
water between them."
Paragraph 35 of the complaint maintains: "A bona fide dispute has arisen between
plaintiffs &nd defendants Martin and Darlene Houck regarding the matters set out*herein and
pursuant to U.C A,*§ 7S-331 ef. seq. (1953, as amended), Plaintiffs are entitled to a
determination of this court declaring the respective rights, status and legal relationship between
the parties based upon statutes, ordinances, irrigation water stock, deeds, prior precedence, and
related matters affecting their duties and responsibilities."
Paragraph 36 then states: "Plaintiffs request declaratory judgment adjudging their
specific responsibilities and duties to Defendants Martin and Darlene Houck regarding the use
and management of irrigation water between the properties."
The complaint upon close review does not indicate exactly what the bona fide dispute is
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nor whaf "matters" are to be addressed in a declaratory judgment action. Paragraph 36 comes
closer than any other p&ragraph, not seeking a declaratory judgment as to the Plaintiff s rights or
duties, but only Seeking new deplaratory judgment adjudicating the specific responsibilities aijtd
duties to "Defendants Martin and DarlendHouck'Nregarding the use and man&gemejit of
irrigation water betweefrthe properties
Utah Rulerof Civil Procedure 56(d) provides, a$,to a case not fully adjudicated by a,
motion:
If on motion under this rule judgment isttDtrendered upon the whole case or for
all the relief asked in the trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion,
by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specified in the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action has-are just.
As stated, in a supplemental telephonic hearing this court attempted to perfonn its duty by asking
plaintiffs9 counsel exactly what declaratory relief was being sought In response to this
questioning, it appears that plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment specifically that they are
entitled under the law to allow their irrigation water to run onto the defendants' property. The
problems with plaintiffs assertion is that such a conclusion is not supported by Utah law.
The defendants have moved that because the factual basis has changed between the initial
complaint and the second amended complaint which plaintiffs attempted to advance under that
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summary judgment should be granted based on m inconsistency between the pleadings.
Defendants cite no law, rule-^or statute in support of this theory. When a pleading is amended
the amended pleading.takes precedence over the former. The fact that pleadings are inconsistent
does not entitle a'pajfty to summary judgment. It should be noted that the Rules of Civil
Procedure and case-law allpw pleading in the alternative. Even if the theories presented are
mutually exclusive as a matter of law* parties are entitled to press inconsistent Iheones and^await
trial and a factual determination before electing which theory actually applies to the, case, Mor$
importantly, in 'this caselhis court denied the motion to allow the second amended complaint.
Accordingly, the'second amended complaint has never become operative in this case.
Nevertheless, within the purview of rule 56(d) this court has attempted to narrow some of
the issues presented by the declaratory judgment action. First, Westfield Irrigation Company is
not a party to this matter. As a result, any judgment of this court cannot as a matter of law
adjudicate any duties or obligations of Westfield Irrigation Company. The only rights which can
be adjudicated are those between the Pintars and the Houcks.
The parties acknowledged and agreed in the telephonic hearing that there were no factual
disputes pertinent to the declaratory judgment. Thus, the only question remaining is whether the
decaratory relief sought is legally sustainable. The court concludes that it is not. It inquired of
the Pintars' counsel as to the law upon which the Pintars were relying. That law purported to
include the Utah cases of Wayment v. Howard, 144 P.3d 1147,1151 (Utah 2006) and Salt Lake
City v. Gardner, 114 P. 147,152 (Utah 1911). However, neither of these cases has any
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relevance to the'issues presented in the declaratory judgment action. Particularly, ijeithei; of
these caises bas anything to do with the issue identified bythe Pintars' counsel at oral argument:,
that is, whether the Pintars are entitled to allow irrigation water to run ontoti^edefendants'
property. BothWayment^znd Gardner address ati appropnator's right to continue use of a
method of diversion. Diversion of water is not synonymous with use of water. Diversion of
water describes the method'by which a water right holder gets water to his.property. Diversion
of water does not describe anything* concerning the control of water onto property of others. The
Waymenf court did disctiss a right to continued historical use of water, but in no waty does that
case address the issues presented here.
On the other hand, Utah law does address the issues presented here. In fact, a case
identified by the Plaintiff at oral argument sets out some principles. In Sanford v. University of
Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 744 (Utah 1971), the court acknowledged the doctrine of reasonable use for
the discharge of surface waters.2 The Sanford court stated:
An unjustified invasion of a possessor's interest in the use and enjoyment
of his land through the medium of surface waters is as much a tort as a
trespass or private nuisance produced by smoke or smells. Nevertheless,
the courts and writers seldom analyzed the problems in terms of tortious
conduct, causation or other tort concepts,
Id. (quoting Kinyon & McClure, Interference with Surface Waters, 24 MENN. L. REV. 891,936

2

It could be argued that the court recognized and applied the reasonable use doctrine,
albeit to subsurface waters, in MacKay v. Breeze, 72 Utah 305, 269 P. 1026 (1928) where the
court held that when one uses an irrigation ditch one must use reasonable efforts to prevent
seepage water from escaping.
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(1940)).
In Sanford the court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 833: "Non-trespassoty
invasions of aperson's^interest in the use and enjpymettt'Qf land resulting from another's
interference with the ftaw*of sctt&ce water are governed by the rule stated in §§822-831/' Thus,
in later cases the reasonable use doctrine' was-applied even in the face of statutory njandate. The
Utah Supreme Courtin Erickson v Bennion,-2& Utah 2d 371, 503 R2d 139 (1972) noted that
Utah Code Ann.'§ 73-1-8 provider" The owner ,of any ditch *,. or other watercourse shall
maintain'tKe same in repair so<as to pf event waste of water or damage to the property of others.

•. if
The court in Erickson noted:1
Notwithstanding the mandatory sound of the emphasized words of that
statute, it is our established law that users of irrigation waters are not
insurers against damages they may cause. They are held only to the
standard of care that is generally applied import law: that which persons of
ordinary intelligence and prudence would observe under the particular

3

This is not so different than the law provided in Provo City Ordinance 10,05.030 which
provides:
(1) Persons using water for irrigation within the limits of the City shall be
required to control all the water distributed to them, and shall be liable for all
damages caused by their neglect.
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person, so using or conducting such water, to
permit the same to flood the street, sidewalks or private property or to run to
unnecessary waste[.]
The court, of course, is not relying on this provision, but only notes its consistency with state law
already established.
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circumstances1,
Erichon, -28 Utah 2d»at 373-74. Therefore, Utah law provides that the Pintars must use
reasonable ^cate in the- use of theirwater so as not to.damage the property of their neighbors.
Utah law likewise answeis Hie question ^as^a whether a person is under a d#ty to protect
their private property-from surface water running dnto it. hi Reeder v Brigham City4 supra, the
Gourt stated:' "[The adjoining landowner] has the'right to be free from receiving waters on his
lands to* his damagfc Which do not'find theit way in-their natural course and ipider natural
conditions."
If the question before the court were one of water drainage due to rainfall and that the
Plaintiffs were seeking declaratory relief that they could allow rainfall to ruq from their property
along natural course's the answer-arrived at might be entirely different. However, here; the water
on the Plaintiffsy property did not arrive* there under natural conditions, instead the water was
diverted from an irrigation system, and, therefore, the declaratory relief is not one connected
with natural runoff.
"The owner of land On which surface waters were wrongfully diverted by [a neighbor] is
not required by law to permit [thai neighbor] to dig a ditch through the land, or to dig the ditch
himself in order to lessen the damages caused by the wrongful diversion." Waters v. Rear, 168
N.C. 246, 84 S.E. 292 (1915). Or, as the Utah Supreme Court stated in Northpoint Consolidated»
Irrigation Co. v. Utah & S.L. Canal Co., 16 Utah 246,266-267, 52 P. 168, 173 (1898):
Undoubtedly a proprietor of higher land is entitled to the benefit of the natural
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flow therefrom, onto the lands of another, of surface or other water not brought
there by artificial means. But, when water is brought on to the higher land by
artificial means, the proprietor is not entitled to such natural flow onto the laud ot,
another, to his injury. The proprietors of higher lands have not the right to the
natural1flowof water brought onto their lands byiartificial means. If natural
forces alone bring water onto a man's land, he may allow natural forces to talfe it
off, {bough it may be deposited on the land'of another, -to his injury. Seepage
from lands, caused by irrigation water brought in canals or other artificial
ditches, cannot be regarded as natural seepage or*drainage. It is not brought there •
alone by natural laws, as water from rain, snow, or springs is.
The defendants have no right to conduct water through their canals on to lands
irrigated by them,r'andthen,by means of draining ditches, conduct, the seepageand surplus water therefrom, rendered unfit for irrigation or domestic uses,,iuto
the Surplus canal; out of which the plaintiff has a right to take water for useful
purposes.
Accordingly, the Houcks are under no duty to perform any act or effort to keep water from
running onto their property.
Thus, Utah law answers the questions put forth by Plaintiff in discussing this matter with
opposing counsel and the court. The law is that the Pintars do have a duty to use their water
reasonably. The court perceives the request for declaratory relief to be one where they have no
duty which Utah law does not support. The second question is likewise answered by Utah law,
that is, that the Houcks are under no duty to undertake activities to prevent water from coming
onto their property. Since Utah law holds the opposite of the declaratory relief sought by the
plaintiffs, this court cannot grant the relief that plaintiffs seek as a matter of law and accordingly
summary judgment must be granted.
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Ill SECTION 1983 CONSPIRACY AND CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIMS
As stated, defendants jnovefor summary judgment on plaintiffs' 1983 conspiracy and,
civil conspiracy maims.., rjainuiis oase inese caaims on meiouowing tacts-: {i) mat tttpre is great
hostility between the parties; (2) that the defendants* daughter and Deputy Morgan,-who initiated,
the charges, both work-for the Utah County Sheriffs pffice; (3) that the Defendants called theik
daughter on the same day they spoke to Deputy Morgan; (4) that the Defendants told Deputy
Morgan where their daughter worked wheft she arrived; and (5) that Deputy Morgan's
investigation was haphazard* and incomplete. Defendants argue that the crux of the plaintiffs'
argument is the alleged relationship between Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck and that
plaintiffs have not forwarded any evidence that these individuals knew each other beyond having ,
heard one another's names. This court concurs andfindsthat the plaintiffs' facts do not support
a claim for conspiracy and that claim fails as a matter of law.
"To prove civil conspiracy, five elements must be shown: '(1) a combination of two.or
more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or
course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result
thereof.'" Peterson v. Delta Airlines, 2002 UT App 56, f 12 (quotings/to Indus v. Hurst, 846
P.2d 1282,1290 n. 17 (Utah 1993)). It is not necessary to show that the parties came together
and made a formal agreement to do the acts by direct evidence. Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon,
746 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, "including the nature of the act done, the relations of the parties, and the interests of
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the alleged conspirators,"-itf.
To support a cause of action for Section 1983 conspiracy,1 a plaintiff must allege specific
facts showing an agreemsntand concerted action arpong the defendants. Cardosp v, Calbone*
490 F.3dtll94, U99 (10* Cfc. 2007).(citing Tonkovich v/Kansas Board ofRegents, 159-F.3d<
504,533 (10Uv Cir/1998)), A plaintiff nitist also show&at "both publip and private actors share
a common, uiicotistitutiQnal goal." Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys<> 195 F.3d £84,596
(10th Or. 1999J).
Whether of not there is a conspiracy is typically a question of fact. See Qallagh$z v.<Neil
YowigFreedom Concert, 49 F3d 1442,1448 (10th Cir. 1995); Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar
Co., 2002 UT 69,1Rf 35-36. However a court may grant summary judgment on an issue that is
normally a question of fact if no reasonable jury could conclude that fact exists, Sanderson v.
First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992). See also Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT
'61, J 50; White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371,1374 (Utah 1994); Clover v. Snowbird Resort,
808 P.2d 1037,1040 (Utah 1991). When a jury would be left to speculation, the action fails as a
matter of law. Hotline v. Baker, 912 P.2d433,439 (Utah 1996).
Both civil conspiracy and Section 1983 conspiracy require that the co-conspirators have a
"meeting of the minds" or agreement, which is the central issue of dispute in this case. Plaintiffs
argue the circumstantial evidence they have submitted infers a meeting of the minds. Although
the court must assume Plaintiffs' facts for purposes of summary judgment, it does not have to
assume any asserted inferences. Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303, 306
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(1956). "Inferences are made for the purpose of aiding reason, not to override it. Inferences are
nothing more than probable o^natural explanation of facts/5 Id. at 306-30?, In this case/fee
court cannot reasonably infer from the evidence given that there was a meeting* of the,minds,
Though circumstantial evidence may by itself support a cause of action foir conspiracy, the
evidence giv6n£in-this instance is insufficient to provide a jury wiih. a reasonable basis for such a
finding.
Pivotal to the allegation that there was a meeting of the minds is the supposed
relationship between Deputy Morgan1 arid Tonya Houck. The defendants' hostility and Dejputy
Morgan's haphazard investigation taken together prove nothing by'themselves, but might
support a theory of conspiracy if an underlying relationship was shown to exist between the
actors. However, no real relationship has been shown or even alleged The only basis upon
which the Plaintiffs rest their allegation of conspiracy is that the parties are aware that they both
work for the Utah County Sheriffs Department-an agenfcy that employs hundreds of people.
The depositions of Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck quoted in the motions clearly show that,
though the parties had heard of each other, they did not know each other personally. The
Plaintiffs do not dispute this. Thus, the evidence in this case is thai Tonya Houck and Deputy
Morgan were just shy of complete strangers. The court cannot reasonably infer from this
circumstance that a conspiracy existed, and no reasonable jury could believe this basis to be
sufficient for a finding that tliere was a meeting of the minds. Therefore, Defendants' Moton for
Summary Judgment is granted on the Section 1983 conspiracy and civil conspiracy claims.
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IV. 1983 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim is void as a matter of Jaw
because simply reporting perceived criminal activity cannot Qualify as malicious persecution,
according to Smith v Colorado Sears Roebuck, 21 Fed. Appx. 796, 801 (10th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs disagree with this interpretation of Smith and argUe that Deputy Morgan did not have
probable cause under Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 to initiate prosecution for disorderly conduct,
therefore, their claim of maliciotts persecution should Survive under summary judgment The
courtfindsthat the plaintiffs' 1983 malicious persecution claim cannot survive because plaintiffs,
have not shown th£t the prosecution was done "undef color of state law" as applied to the
Houcks.
The federal statute for malicious persecution states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation . . . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity or other proceeding for redress . . . [ . ]
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a Section 1983 suit, the plaintiffs have to prove: (1) that there was
continued confinement or prosecution; (2) that the original action terminated in favor of the ,
plaintiff; (3) that there was no probable cause to support the original arrest, continued
confinement, or prosecution; (4) that the defendant acted with malice; and (5) that the plaintiff
sustained damages. Novitslcy v. City ofAurora, 491 F.3d 1244,1258 (10th Cir. 2007)(quoting
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Pierce v.Gilchfist, 359-F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004)), A plaintiff must also show that the defendant,
acted "under color of State law/' in other words, that the defendant participated in, joint action
with the State or its agents., Uennis v, Sparfo, 449 U.S. 24,27 (1980). To assert that the arrest,
was a 'state actiqn* in a conclusory* allegation without a sufficient factual foundation i$
insufficient; the pleadings mustpresjent facts tending to show agreement and concerted actiouN
Smith v. Colorado Sears Roehuqh 21 Fed. Appx.796, 8Q0 (10th Car. 2001).
in orderto assert a claim of 1983 malicious prosecution with regard to the Hoicks,
plaintiffs must assert facts tending to show agreement and concerted action with Deputy Morgan
to deprive plaintiffs of a constitutional right. Whether there was an agreement and concerted
action would typically he a question of fact, as referenced above However, as also
aforementioned, this court may grant a motion for summary judgment, notwithstanding a
question of fact, if no reasonable jury could conclude that fact exists. In the previous section,
this court concluded that no reasonable jury could tmct that there was a conspiracy or a meeting
of the minds between the Houcks and Deputy Morgan given the facts alleged by the plaintiffs.
Setting aside averments of conspiracy, the only evidence that the Houcks acted in concert
or agreement with a state actor is their complaints to the Utah County Sheriffs Office and
Deputy Morgan. However, reporting suspected criminal activity or filing a complaint against an
individual does not fulfill the 'under color of state law' requirement of Section 1983. Pino v.
HiggSy 73 F.3d 1461,1465 (10th Cir. 1996)(private party reported defendant was engaging in
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criminal activity); Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974)(private party filed a
complaint against defendant). See also Grdw v.*FIshe& 523 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 19,75); Brooks v.
Peters, 322K Supp. 1273 (DC Wis. 1971); Kahemqnes v, Marches^ 361 F.Supp,16p (DC Pa
1973);• Weyondtv. Ma$oH 's Stores, Inc., 279 F, Supp, 283 (DC Pa 1968). Because Mr. Pkrtax's,
alleged constitutional deprivation was. not done under color of state law, the plaintiffs cannot,
sustain their 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Thus, defendants' motipn for summary
judgment on the, 1 £83 malicious prosecution claim is granted.
V. DEFAMATION CLAIM
Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiffs' defamation cause of action. The
plaintiffs allege four incidents of defamation. First, on August 20,2006 the Defendants
complained to Deputy Morgan that Mr. Pintar had said "there goes the monkees [sic]" on June
11,2006 and shook his finger at them and made derogatory comments when Defendants walked
by on July 4,2006. Second, on August 20,2006 the Plaintiffs told Deputy Morgan that the
Pmtars had improperly flooded their property. Third, Mrs. Houck made several complaints to
the Utah State Bar Office of Professional Conduct regarding the Plaintiffs and their attorney.4
Fourth, Mrs. Houck complained to the Utah County Sheriffs Department5 that someone had
sped toward her and then turned into the Pintar property and that this action made her afraid that

4

These actions are alleged to have occurred in early 2009 through the summer of 2009.

5

These actions are alleged to have occurred m August 2009.
Page 19 of 27

the'Pititars were going;"fo^tiaikeher 'out;?i<s
Thfe third and fourth allegations - statements' tathe Office of Professional Cmiduct and
the speeding'car - are easy to dispose of; 'Since those statements are alleged to baye "occurred
long after the complaint* wasTiled,. they cannot possibly form the basis of the blaims in
plaintiffs* complaintasa-matterof law; On this baSig alone, summary judgment -mast "be-granted*
•Oh thebe as'sertibhs. As" Will be explained hereafter; those- claims- suffer from other fatal
defieieneiesas well.
"To state a claim for defamation, [plaintiffs] must show that defendants published'the
statements concerning him, that the statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to.any
privilege, that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault and that .their
publication resulted in damage." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999,. 1007-08 (Utah
1999). "Whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question of law;
.. .[.]**./(£ at 10Q8,. To be .defamatory-under Utah Jaw, a communication must attack an
individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or publish his or her natural defects in a:way
that would hurt his or her reputation or expose him.or her to public hatred. Cox v. Hatch, 761
P,2d 556,561 (Utah 1988)(citing Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1)),

6

In the memorandum in opposition the Pintars also claim Darlene Houck stated that thePintar fkmily sued El don Money, that neighbors run in fear of the Pintars, that the Pintars have
intimidated the Westfield Irrigation Water Board, all statements which the Pintars maintain-are
false. None of these alleged statements can be found in plaintiffs' complaint.
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This Court holds thatfhe statements upon which plaintiffs assert their defamation cause of
action fail as a matter of law because they are not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning.
The Utah Supreme Court.has .explained:
Whether a publication of an-alleged defamatory statement.,. is capable of
conveying a defamatory message is initially a question of law.
The tort of defamation protects ojily reputation. A publication is not defamatory,
simply because it is nettlesome or embarrassing to plaintiff, or even because it
makes a false statement about the plaintiff. Thus, an embarrassing, even though
false, statement that does not damage one's reputation is not actionable as libel 03
slander. If no defamatory meaning can reasonably be inferred by reasonable
persons from the communication, the action must be dismissed for failure to state
a claim. Only if the court first determines that a publication might be considered
defamatory by a reasonable person is their effect issue for the trier of fact.
Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). This court concludes that assuming that the
Houcks did in fact communicate to Deputy Morgan that Mr. Pintar had said "there go the
monkees [sic]," made other derogatory comments toward the Houcks, and shook his finger at the
Houcks does not convey a defamatory meaning, even where the Pintars steadfastly deny that any
such thing happened. The fact that the communication is false, which this court assumes on
summary judgment, does not make it defamatory.
Likewise, a statement by the Houcks that the Pintars had improperly flooded their
property, even if untrue, does not impugn the Pintars* reputation. Accordingly, as a matter oi
law, the communication does not convey a defamatory meaning. On this basis alone, stimma
judgment must be granted.

alleged "wrongdoing stated in Mr.*Pintar*s charging document. Their statements were recorded
in police Teports 'so th&t they could be preserved for the purpose of initiating a judicial
proceeding if such'a proceeding was initiated. *
Because the'Houck's statements to Deputy Morgan and the Utah County Sheriffs Office
are part of a judicial proceeding, they are privileged and cannot be used as the subject of a
defamation action. For the foreeoine reasons, defendants' motion for summary juclgme,nt on the
aeiamauon cause 01 auiion is granted,
VI. CLAIMS 6 F INTENTIONAL AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Finally, defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiffs intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress causes of action. They argue that plaintiffs allegations are too
vague to sustain these claims. They also aver that plaintiffs cannot sustain this cause of action
because they cannot sustain their other causes of action. Plaintiffs contend that they have shown
that defendants have willfully and maliciously worked in concert with Deputy Morgan to have
Mr. Pintar arrested and charged with a crime without the requisite probable cause. These
actions, plaintiffs argue, go against generally accepted standards of decency and support £ claim
of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
To prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that defendant
intentionally engaged in some conduct toward plaintiff with the purpose of inflicting emotional
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distress where a reasonable person would have known such would result and his actions are of
such a nature as to be considered,outrageous and intolerable in that they offend generally •
acceptable standards of decency or morality. Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, \
55(citing Bemet tt Janes Waldo Bolbrook & McDonough, 2Q03 UT 9, If 58 (2003)), To be considered outrageous, the conduct must "evoke outrage or revulsion; it must be more than
unreasonable* unking or unfair." Franco v. Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-day Saints, 2001 UT
25,f 28 (quoting 86 C J.S. Torts § 70 at 722), It is not outrageous "merely.because it is tortious,
injurious, malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it is illegal."
itf.(quotmg 86 CJ.S. Torts §70 at 722-23).
Because of the "highly subjective and volatile nature of emotional distress . . . the courts
have historically been wary of dangers in opening the door to recovery." Samms v. Eccles, 11
Utah 2d 289,291 (1961). Therefore, 'the sufficiency of [the] pleadings must be determined by
the facts pleaded rather than the conclusions stated.*" Franco, 2001 UT 25 at f 25 (quoting
Ellefsen v. Roberts, 526 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah 1974).
Plaintiffs cite the following facts as evidence of defendants' intent to cause Plaintiffs
emotional distress: (1) defendants have hostility toward the Plaintiffs; (2) defendants' daughterin-law is employed with the Utah County Sheriffs Department; (3) defendants contacted the
Utah County Sheriffs Department regarding Plaintiffs; (4) defendants told Deputy Morgan of
the Utah County Sheriffs Department that their daughter-in-law worked for that Department; (5)
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based on the'actions of Defendants and Officer Morgan acting in concert Mr, Pintar yyas arrested
without any investigation* or having committed any crime
As stated above, this court concludes that £ reasonable jury could not find that there was .
a conspiracy or a meeting df the'minds between defendants and Deputy Morgan based on the
factual allegations presented by plaintiffs; The court will proceed with its analysis looking at'iiie,
alleged facts oii their face without inferring a conspiracy, as plaintiffs claim.
The court holds that the plaintiffs' asserted facts are insufficient to support a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. It is dubious that a jury would find the defendants'
statements to the Utah County Sheriffs Office and Deputy Morgan regarding Mr. Pintar to be
outrageous/intolerable, or so cruel as to evoke revulsion. However, even if a jury made such a
finding, each of these statements is protected by the judicial proceeding privilege. "The judicial
proceeding1 privilege extends not only to defamation claims but to all claims arising from the
same statements" including'a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. DeBry v,
Godbe, 1999 UT 111, f 25. See also Bennett, 2003 UT 9,1f 61 and Alderink v. Bardin, 2004 UT
App 330. Because the defendants' statements to the Utah County Sheriffs Office and Deputy
Morgan were made for the purpose of initiating a judicial proceeding, they are exempted from
being the subject of a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiffs also allege negligent infliction of emotional distress. The elements for
negligent infliction of emotional distress are: the actor causes emotional distress to another
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resulting in illness or bodily harm where the actor should have .realized his conduct involved an :«•
unreasonable risk of causing the distress, other than by knowledge of harm of a third person, and
he should have realized .the distress might result in illness or bodily harm. Anderson, 2005 UT
36 at $57, A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress doesn't require pTOof 0 f
outrageous conduct,
Debry ^jresumalDly applies to this'type of claim as well. Thus, defendants' statements to
the police are a part of a judicial proceeding and cannot be considered. Even if .they could be
considered, "however, the plaintiffs have not shown that they have received illness or bodily harm
which would entitle them to damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Therefore,
Plaintiffs causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress aredismissed.
Plaintiffs causes of action for negligent and intentional misrepresentation have been
dismissed by Stipulation, so they will not be addressed.,
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant^ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, in its
entirety. The trial is hereby stricken. Counsel for the defendants shall prepare, an order adopting
this memorandum deeisicarby reference and submit it as provided in the rules of GiviJ procedure-
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